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[fis070] Is information a sufficient basis for cognition? (Part 1)

1 Universitat de Barcelona, Spain
2 Science of Information Institute, USA
3 Universidad de León, Spain
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
30 July 2010
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Based upon the natural limits of observation, we tackle a critical review of Dretske's approach to information, knowledge and perception. The physics of the manifestation of an arbitrary object –tackled in Part 2 as a separate article– sets forth an informational boundary stating that information cannot be enough to support our cognitive processes. The problems do not rely –as Dretske supposes- on the lacks of the channel, but on the very nature of observation. Furthermore, Dretske's approach –handcuffed to his maximalist support on information- presents some lacks concerning processual character of information, fuzziness of perception and knowledge, contents de dicto and conventional regularities. The posed limits and problems intend to settle new foundations for a more refined conjunction of information and knowledge.


Physics of observation, Waves, Inverse problem, Theory of perception, Biophysics, Dretske, Epistemology, Communication, Cognition, Signal, Information content, Information Flow

Cite this article as

Pérez-Montoro Gutiérrez, M.; Díaz Nafría, J. Is information a sufficient basis for cognition? (Part 1). In Proceedings of the 4th Int. Conf. Found. Inf. Sci., 21–24 August 2010; Beijing, China, fis070;

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