

1 Article

# 2 Development of an asset lifetime model for 3 distribution network management

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10 **Abstract:** Aging infrastructures maintenance results in increasing asset investment in order to  
11 provide and maintain a specific level of service to consumers. In this regard, efficient replacement  
12 policies are needed. This paper proposes a method for improving renewal efficiency in water  
13 supply systems through a reliable asset lifetime model that will lead investments to those elements  
14 with greater impact in service provision to the end user. As uncertainties are minimized, the  
15 likelihood of failure will be more accurate and renewal investments will become more efficient.  
16 Therefore, the failure predictor model has been built in a reliable manner through collected data  
17 from Madrid distribution network which comprises more than 17.000 km with over 400.000 water  
18 pipes. It is based on the statistical analysis of historical data from over 55.000 system failures  
19 gathered during four complete years. Additionally, detailed information from more than 4.400  
20 disturbance events was recorded through field visits and laboratory essays of soil and pipe  
21 materials when failures were repaired. Examination of such large series of data recorded allows a  
22 better understanding of explanatory factors of failures. It is an essential step for building a  
23 consistent asset lifetime model. According to this model, a renewal strategy is proposed. It based  
24 on the risk of service disturbance and involved costs. It supports planning and operation decisions  
25 reaching failures reduction and system resiliency improvement.

26 **Keywords:** Asset lifetime model, system Failure, service disturbance, asset management.

27 **PACS:** J0101

28

## 29 1. Introduction

30 Providing an appropriate level of service is the primary goal for water suppliers in urban water  
31 distribution systems. Even though a certain level of service is defined by regulatory standards,  
32 service responsible agents use to set their own commitments of service with thresholds that go  
33 beyond such specifications for improving customer satisfaction level. In this regard, the level of  
34 service, considered as the guarantee of supply at every property, can be measured in terms of  
35 continuity of service, pressure and quality provided to the end user.

36 On the other hand, service suppliers make remarkable efforts to establish suitable asset  
37 management policies. Aging infrastructures require increasing asset investment for maintaining the  
38 level of service. So that, developing a cost effective asset renewal and replacement strategy is  
39 essential. Two different strategies for replacement optimization have been analyzed in the literature  
40 [1]. One of them is focused the optimal replacement time for a pipe while the other is based on  
41 prioritizing the pipes in the network for replacement under a certain budget.

42 Actually, water suppliers are focused on improving efficiency in CAPEX & OPEX for some  
43 horizons and scenarios but all issues involved in asset management are linked to uncertainty. The  
44 key for a better asset management is to set criteria, methods and systems to facilitate that

45 improvement of efficiency at the decision making process through uncertainties minimization. So  
46 that, managing uncertainty becomes a primary goal that would probably result in a better asset  
47 management for providing the desired level of service.

48 In addition, main constraints and targets are linked to the fulfillment of standard of service  
49 under normal demands, normal operation and normal operability of infrastructures. However, since  
50 normal conditions are a never happened scenario, resilience of supply system turns into a key  
51 concept to incorporate in asset management. So, it must be properly defined as a component of  
52 standard of service.

53 Water suppliers use different systems to take decisions assuming values that manage  
54 uncertainty: demand evolution, asset real capacity, operation feasibility, events resolution time, etc.  
55 Efficiency can be assessed by analysing the combination of total costs and their link to network's  
56 vulnerability rate [2]. It involves a deep understanding of system performance, system resiliency  
57 and network deterioration process. Additionally, when costs are analysed a Multi-Criteria method  
58 based on risk aspects and effects for consumers is needed [3].

59 This way, an effective asset management requires condition assessment. It includes the  
60 collection of information about assets condition, analysis of this information, and ultimately  
61 transformation of this information into knowledge, leading to effective decision about likelihood of  
62 failure and renewal [4]. Hunaidi [5] classifies condition assessment methods into direct and indirect  
63 methods. Direct methods include automated/manual visual inspection, non destructive testing and  
64 pipe sampling. Indirect methods include water audit, flow testing, and measurement of soil  
65 resistivity to determine the risk of deterioration. But uncertainties are still substantial.

66 Some solutions are focused on the development of water networks models to foresee the system  
67 possible behavior. However, when defining assets lifetime models, uncertainty has also to be faced.  
68 Failures in pipelines depend on many factors that are difficult to characterize quantitatively [6]. So  
69 that, some research projects are being developed for a better understanding of the explanatory  
70 factors of bursts and failures. Additionally, different asset lifetime models have been developed.  
71 Kleiner and Rajani [7] grouped them as physically based models and statistical models. While the  
72 first group aims to discover the physical mechanisms behind pipe breaks, statistical models are  
73 based on historical break data to identify break patterns in the water mains [8].

74 As Xu et al. [9] affirms, in the absence of deterministic physical models for pipe break,  
75 data-driven techniques provide a promising approach to investigate the principles underlying pipe  
76 break. However the uncertainties associated with the recorded failure data provides imprecise  
77 results of the methodologies or models used [10]. In this regard, a model able to calculate the  
78 residual and economic assets lifetime should be built from reliable data in a robust manner.

79 Therefore, the presented method proposes a statistical failure prediction model which is built  
80 from a complete database of failures. It is developed from two complementary databases: in the first  
81 one, every failure at each element has been carefully registered along 4 years period (2010-2014); in  
82 the second one, additional information from field visits to failures repair has been included for  
83 improving this approach. In such way, assets renewal policies can be led efficiently through a  
84 strategy for replacement based on the risk of service disturbance. The paper also presents results  
85 from the case study of Madrid water supply system, where Investment Plans are issued every year  
86 for minimizing the likelihood of bursts while improving system resilience. It shows how renewal  
87 policies efficiency can be improved from different hypothesis in the decision process.  
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## 89 2. Materials and Methods

90 In this paper, a method for improving renewal efficiency in water supply systems through a  
91 reliable asset lifetime model is presented. The priority of investment is defined according to the  
92 concept of possible service disturbance events which are linked to the likelihood of failure at each  
93 element of the system and its impact in the level of service provided. Thus, the risk of service  
94 disturbance is defined as follows (1):

95

$$96 \quad \text{Risk of service disturbance} = \text{Likelihood of failure} \cdot \text{Consequences} \quad (1)$$

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100 This way, the proposed method is based on the minimization of uncertainty linked to the  
101 prediction of system disturbances while analysing its consequences and system resilience. In this  
102 context, a reliable model of failure prediction for defining assets lifetime is needed to minimize  
103 uncertainty. Through this model a more accurate diagnoses of system condition can be obtained in  
104 order to lead renewal and replacement policies.

105 Renewal efficiency is considered as the investment option that reduces disturbances impact as  
106 well as optimizes investment costs. Therefore, this approach also includes the evaluation of costs by  
107 considering the trade-off between replacement cost and the cost related to failures. The cost of  
108 failures includes not only service disturbance impact to end users as a cost but also repair costs.  
109 From this approach, assets lifetime is governed by an age threshold where renewal cost is below the  
110 cost related to failures.

111 Developed methodology can be explained in two steps. First of all, a failure prediction model is  
112 proposed. Then, renewal strategy is defined according to the risk of service disturbance and  
113 involved costs.

### 112 2.1. Failure prediction model

113 It has been built from the historical data of system failures gathered during four years, between  
114 2010 and 2014. Along this period, more than 55.000 pipe failures were recorded and repaired. These  
115 episodes correspond to bursts and leakages in water pipes and connections. Likewise, more than  
116 4.400 out of the total mentioned disturbance events have been analyzed in detail through field visits  
117 and laboratory essays of soil and pipe materials, where further information of failure causes have  
118 been identified accurately.

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130 **Figure 1.** Field visits to water network failures.

131 According to this information, every element in the supply system has been characterized by  
132 the attributes that could have more relevance in failures. Assets deterioration process is influenced  
133 by different parameters; some of them are physical factors but others depend on operational  
134 circumstances. Therefore, a reliable analysis should include data from both pipe characteristics and  
135 hydraulic analysis. From a complete study of all failure variables identified they have been classified  
136 as: factors linked to external agents, intrinsic element factors, operational factors and installation  
137 factors.

138 In order to analyze relations between elements and failures, some data such as age, material,  
139 diameter, and depth has been obtained from the geographic information system (GIS). Other factors  
140 related to operation like average operation pressure, pressure oscillation and water velocity among  
141 others have been calculated by calibrated models of system perform. Pressure transients have been

142 also included in this study analysing the relationship between system manoeuvres at special  
 143 network elements and its incidence in the rest of system's components. For that, information from a  
 144 database where operational manoeuvres are recorded has been examined. Some other specific  
 145 factors, gathered from failures visits in situ, provide information about causes of bursts to confirm if  
 146 the failure has been produced by a particular event or if it is the consequence of element  
 147 deterioration. Some of such field and laboratory observed factors have been the type of surrounding  
 148 soil, the soil temperature measured, field pressure registered, deficiencies on elements materials,  
 149 deficient installation conditions related to bedding and level of compacting of the embedment soil,  
 150 the occurrence of external factors like constructions works in the area closed to the failure, external  
 151 loads from traffic or walls or presence of roots, and maintenance conditions, including the level of  
 152 internal and external corrosion and section thickness reduction.

153 All these explanatory factors have been studied for each failure element in order to characterize  
 154 them. A statistical analysis has been developed considering uniform groups of components in the  
 155 water system: Strategic water mains, distribution water mains, service connections and special  
 156 network elements such as manoeuvre valves, air valves, or drainage pipes among others.  
 157

		Service connections	Distribution pipes	Strategic pipes	Network Elements
Geographic Information System (GIS)	Diameter	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Age	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Material	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Depth	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Location (buried, chambers...)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Geological, urban and regional Planning Maps	Type of soil	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Soil cover	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Traffic loads	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Bursts and leakages records	Failures' date and location	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Spatial failures distribution	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Temporal failures distribution	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Field visits to bursts and laboratory tests	Soil temperature	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Soil agresiviness	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Isolated conductive zones	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Pipe bedding condition	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Compaction of embedment soil	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Deficiencies on elements materials	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Field pressure registered	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	External loads from traffic or walls	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Presence of roots	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Corrosion (internal and external)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Section thickness reduction	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Calibrated hydraulic models of system perform	Max. Pressure	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Av. Pressure	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Mn. Pressure	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Max. Velocity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Av. Velocity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Min. Velocity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Monitoring records (SCADA)	Max. Pressure at sectors' entrance	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Min. pressure at sectors' entrance	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Pressure oscilation at sectors' entrance	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Operation and works records	Operational manoeuvres	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

158

159

Figure 2. Burst observed factors and most relevant explanatory factors selected.

160 In order to built an asset lifetime model, the likelihood of failure is related to the cumulative  
 161 distribution function of the time  $F(t)$  for each group of components. It is defined as follows (2) for a  
 162 period  $[t, t+\Delta t]$ :

$$163 \quad p_f(t, t + \Delta t) = \int_t^{t+\Delta t} f(\tau) d\tau = F(t + \Delta t) - F(t) \quad (2)$$

164  
 165 The analysis of all explanatory factors for every group of components minimizes the error in the  
 166 prediction of the expected number of failures for each validation scope. The correlation between  
 167 registered episodes and the characterization of the involved element at each event results in the  
 168 determination of the likelihood of failure for every system element. The expected number of failures  
 169 is obtained through the probability density function given by the studied factors which is defined as  
 170 the likelihood of failure for service connections and special elements and the likelihood of failure per  
 171 unit length in case of strategic and distribution pipes.

172 For exporting results to every element at each group of system's components, the final model  
 173 considers the explanatory factors with higher relevance in failures by multiplying the failure  
 174 predictor model dependent to the time and the corrective coefficients proposed for the other selected  
 175 factors (3). The corrective coefficients are obtained through the quotient between the distribution  
 176 function linked to failures and the generic distribution function for each factor.

$$177 \quad p = p_1(t) \cdot f_2 \cdot f_3 \cdot f_4 \quad (3)$$

178 Where  $p_1(t)$  is the likelihood of failure given by the time and  $f_2, f_3$  y  $f_4$  are the corrective  
 179 coefficients for selected explanatory factors 2, 3 and 4.

## 180 2.1. Renewal strategy

181 In a second step, consequences of failures are measured. The renewal strategy is based on an  
 182 economical analysis between benefits of a minor service disturbance ratio over the total replacement  
 183 cost. So that, consequences are evaluated in terms of service interruption impact and costs. The  
 184 variables in this analysis are: replacement cost, which depends on element material and its  
 185 environmental conditions such as soil type, land uses and loads and pipe trench depth; element  
 186 failure impact that depends on the duration of service disturbance, the number of properties  
 187 involved by each failure, the time of disturbance needed for failure detection and its repair, and its  
 188 monetary conversion; repair cost which varies according to elements physical characteristics and its  
 189 location.

190 This way, every element in the system has new attributes related to the impact of its potential  
 191 failure that is defined as 'properties x hour' with service interruption, its repair cost and its  
 192 replacement cost. The concept of 'properties x hour' includes not only the number of customers  
 193 affected by each failure but also the duration time of their affection. For calculating replacement cost,  
 194 some simplifications in renewal policies have been introduced, assuming that every element is  
 195 replaced by an identical one.

196 The benefit of replacing an element depends on the likelihood of failure of both, the old and the  
 197 new element. It can be measured by the cost linked to each failure  $c_f$  and the reduction in the  
 198 likelihood of failure which varies with the time. Thus, the analysis should include a corrective  
 199 coefficient which considers a reduction in expected costs for future failures. In order to assess the  
 200 convenience of replacing a certain element, renewal costs  $c_s$  must be compared to obtained  
 201 benefit  $C_R$ . For a proper analysis, benefit must be discounted back to its present value which depends  
 202 on the discount rate selected  $r$ .

203 Therefore, benefit of replacement  $C_R$  for a horizon of  $N$  years can be calculated by the  
 204 following formula (4), where  $A$  is the old element with an age of  $k$  years, and  $R$  is the new element.  
 205 While  $p_i$  is the likelihood of failure for the year  $i$  obtained from the lifetime model,  $p_{i+k}$  is the  
 206 corresponding likelihood of failure for an element of  $k$  years.

$$207 \quad C_R = c_f \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{p_{i+k}^A - p_i^R}{(1+r)^i} \quad (4)$$


209 Finally, according to its service perturbation and costs, a priority list of elements that should be  
 210 replaced can be obtained. In such way, renewal investments will be led in an efficient manner to  
 211 those elements with greater impact in service provision to the end user while optimizing  
 212 investments.

213 **2. Results and Discussion**


214 The water utility Canal de Isabel II Gestión, which supplies water to more than six million  
 215 people in the Madrid area (Spain), applies asset management system for Investment Plans  
 216 (enlargement and replacement) and for Operational Resilience improvement. The key points of this  
 217 system are infrastructures lifetime and resilience assessment. With the main goal of improving  
 218 service provision linked to aging infrastructures, the most efficient distribution of annual investment  
 219 budget is required.

220 The proposed method has been applied in the network in order to assess how the efficiency of  
 221 investment changes with different hypothesis of the failure predictor model. It has been applied to  
 222 Madrid Region where the network comprises more than 17.000 km with over 400.000 water pipes.

223 Figure 3 presents the main characteristics of the proposed case study for every group of  
 224 components. Strategic water mains, distribution water mains, service connections and special  
 225 network elements are graphically characterized in relation to its age and diameter. For each of them  
 226 the generic cumulative distribution function (generic FDA) and the failure conditioned distribution  
 227 function are illustrated (conditioned FDA). They have been built according to historical available  
 228 data until 2014. Graphics related to age begins at the year when information is reliable so they start  
 229 with a specific value of cumulative distribution functions (20% -35%).  
 230



231  
 232 **Figure 3.a** Distribution water mains



234  
 235 **Figure 3.b** Strategic water mains

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



Figure 3.c Service connections






Figure 3.d Special network elements

Figure 3. Group of components characterized in relation to its age and diameter.

As can be observed in the figures for distribution water mains the gradient of the failure conditioned distribution function is greater than the generic one along the 25 first years, what means that the likelihood of failure is higher for pipes installed in those years. The performance is similar in the case of strategic pipes for those installed in the 15 first years represented and for service connections for those elements installed along the 10 first years considered in the graphic. For special elements the likelihood of failure is higher for those installed in the 35 first years considered.

Regarding system's diameter, almost the 90% of distribution water mains present diameters smaller than 250 mm, and the likelihood of failure is greater for pipes with diameters lower than 150 mm. In the case of strategic water mains, the 80% of pipes present diameters smaller than 1000 mm and the likelihood of failure is greater for pipes with diameters below 500 mm. Besides, more than 90% of service connections present diameters inferior to 50 mm and while the more frequently installed diameter in the recent year is 20 mm, the greater gradient of failures is presented for diameter 40 mm which was installed in the past. The 90% of special elements got diameters below 250 mm and failure is more frequent for those where diameter is smaller than 80 mm.


Described methodology has been applied to this case study. Firstly assets lifetime has been calculated through the failure prediction model, defining the likelihood of failure for every element. Then, a second module calculates for each of them its potential failure impact in service provision as the risk of service disturbance measured by 'properties x hour' and the repair cost. Then, it is compared with the renewal cost as it is presented in Figure 4 for distribution water mains and in Figure 5 for strategic water mains. The point cloud for each case represents every element. It allows identifying the priority list for replacement by defining a red line as a threshold. The elements in the left side of the red line should be selected for renewal strategy because the relevance of the risk of service disturbance or, because the cost of renewal is not too high in relation to the impact of failure.



268

269 **Figure 4.** Results for renewal strategy in distribution water mains.

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271

272 **Figure 5.** Results for renewal strategy in distribution water mains.

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274 Moreover, elements located in the right side of the threshold proposed include some cases that  
 275 preventive replacement implies great disturbances. It is the case of critical pipes for providing  
 276 service where assuming the risk of failure is recommended.

277

278 As replacement priorities change according to system conditions and previous investments, the  
 proposed method forecasts annually the set of pipes that should be renewed to minimize service  
 disturbance.

## 279 5. Conclusions

280

As conclusion, asset lifetime models reliability is a relevant factor to consider for leading water  
 replacement investments and giving support in water utilities decision making process.

281

In that process the lifetime model provides useful information in terms of planning as well as  
 operation. Planning is improved because pipes which should be renewed (depending on investment  
 availability) are clearly identified. That decision is made based on the risk of service disturbance as  
 well as the cost-benefit analysis of renewal. Operating decisions are improved by reducing the  
 likelihood of failures, improving system resiliency and economic analysis of repairing or replacing  
 designated assets.

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Building a robust failure prediction model based on detailed databases of failures is essential to  
 minimize uncertainties in the likelihood of service disturbance events calculation. Different models  
 based on Madrid's network data are proposed for service connections, distribution pipes, transport

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
291 mains & elements. Results confirmed that models with more than 4 variables do not add  
292 predictability.

293 As replacement priorities change according to system conditions and previous investments, the  
294 model of residual useful life forecasts annually the set of pipes that should be renewed to minimize  
295 service disturbance. The new renewal strategy based on the proposed useful life model will provide  
296 an improvement of investment efficiency for water companies but also it will increase customers'  
297 satisfaction from reductions on service disturbance events.

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299 **References**300  
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