Denialism—the consistent dismissal of solid evidence or widespread agreement—represents a substantial obstacle to public discussions, scientific advancement, and shared decision-making. Although frequently viewed as an issue of misinformation or irrational behavior, this paper contends that denialism can be more effectively examined using the framework of epistemic game theory. Within this framework, the decisions of agents rely not solely on their own preferences but importantly on their perceptions of others’ knowledge, rationality, and probable behaviors. Denialists, specialists, and broader society engage in a complicated strategic landscape influenced by belief systems, information imbalances, and the presence or absence of a shared understanding. Denialism arises and persists not only due to ignorance but also as a logical reaction to perceived doubts regarding the reliability of information sources, the dependability of experts, and the convictions of others. Modeling these interactions as epistemic games allows for a formal analysis of how disruptions in common knowledge and changes in belief systems sustain denialist tactics, despite substantial evidence. This method highlights the philosophical aspects of denialism—posing inquiries regarding rationality, trust, and the essence of public reasoning—and indicates that successful interventions should address not only gaps in information but also the profound epistemic factors that influence collective belief construction and opposition to evidence.