EventsThe 1st International Online Conference of the Journal Philosophies
Published
This submission belongs to the session GS. General Session of the event The 1st International Online Conference of the Journal Philosophies
Published date
06 May, 2025
Academic Editor
author-avatarMarcin Schroeder
Citation
Diane Proudfoot, Four myths about Turing’s view of intelligence and his test, in Proceedings of The 1st International Online Conference of the Journal Philosophies, 10 June–14 June 2025, MDPI: Basel, Switzerland
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Four myths about Turing’s view of intelligence and his test

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1. University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, New Zealand
Abstract

In current inquiry into intelligence, Turing’s work is regarded as foundational. Yet misunderstandings of his view of (the concept of) intelligence and his famous test of intelligence in machines are widespread. I shall argue that four standard interpretations of Turing and his imitation game are mistaken. First, that Turing was (in an influential sense) a behaviourist about the mind. Second, that his approach to the mind was (again in an influential sense) computationalist. Third, that Turing’s philosophy of mind was radically different from that of his contemporary, Wittgenstein, who in turn was a severe critic of Turing. And last, that Turing’s test has been passed by recent GPT models—with the result that we need a new test of intelligence in machines.

Keywords
The concept of intelligence in Turing
Wittgenstein
and Anscombe
Intelligence and Consciousness in Natural and Artificial Systems
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