EventsThe 1st International Online Conference of the Journal Philosophies
Published
This submission belongs to the session GS. General Session of the event The 1st International Online Conference of the Journal Philosophies
Published date
09 Jun, 2025
Academic Editor
author-avatarGordana Dodig Crnkovic
Citation
Marcus Abundis, Intelligence and The “Hard Problem” of Consciousness—a short analysis, in Proceedings of The 1st International Online Conference of the Journal Philosophies, 10 June–14 June 2025, MDPI: Basel, Switzerland
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Intelligence and The “Hard Problem” of Consciousness—a short analysis

1. Formerly: Organizational Behavior (GFTP), Graduate School of Business, Stanford University (March 2011)., Switzerland
Abstract

SUMMARY: This paper situates the study of intelligence in relation to David Chalmers’s anti-scientific Hard Problem, suggesting that evolution by means of natural selection (EvNS) and information theory are likely useful scientific approaches.

ABSTRACT: As a prelude to ‘intelligence studies’, one must cover the long-held claim of an imagined Hard Problem—that a grasp of the human mind lies wholly beyond scientific views.

The formal study of human mentation surely remains challenging, as persistent ‘material–immaterial’ analogues are represented in the literature as a “symbol grounding problem”, “solving intelligence”, a missing “theory of meaning”, and more. The above Hard Problem claim thus has high intuitive appeal, lying open since the time of pre-socratic philosopher Anaxagoras. Hence, issues of ‘subjective phenomena’ —in relation to informatic intelligence studies—still hold sway in many corners, being unresolved.

But to say that a Hard Problem eternally surpasses science lacks equal intuitive appeal. Moreover, the literature shows that the close study of the Hard Problem is rare. Instead, most researchers continue with an ‘intuitive vein’, often claiming that 1) the Hard Problem is a plainly absurd view unworthy of study, or 2) it is an innately intractable issue beyond practical study, where neither side ever offers much actual clarifying detail.

As such, this paper takes a different approach—that of firmly assessing the Hard Problem’s original statement(s) contra one specific scientific role: evolution by means of natural selection (EvNS). The paper closely examines the logic behind the Hard Problem's claims, as seen in the literature over the years.

The paper's analysis ultimately shows that the Hard Problem’s logic is deeply flawed, especially in relation to EvNS—with the implication that EvNS still remains available for explaining/exploring consciousness. Moreover, this study suggests that an ‘information theory’ approach is likely best for addressing an extant material–immaterial divide—paper available.

KEYWORDS: science; philosophy; information; information theory; information science; hard problem; intelligence; consciousness; natural selection; zombies

Keywords
science
philosophy
information
information theory
information science
hard problem
intelligence
consciousness
natural selection
zombies
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