EventsThe 1st International Electronic Conference on Games
Published
This submission belongs to the session S2. Behavioral, Experimental, and Cooperative Game Theory and Bargaining of the event The 1st International Electronic Conference on Games
Published date
14 Oct, 2025
Academic Editor
author-avatarMarco Marini
Citation
Elif Tosun, Daniel Navarro-Martinez, Shohei Yamamoto, Putting negotiation in context: The US vs. Japan, in Proceedings of The 1st International Electronic Conference on Games, 15 October–16 October 2025, MDPI: Basel, Switzerland
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Putting negotiation in context: The US vs. Japan

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Daniel Navarro-Martinez 1
Shohei Yamamoto 2
1. Department of Economics and Business, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona School of Economics, Barcelona School of Management, Spain, Spain
2. Rikkyo University, College of Economics, 3-34-1 Nishi-Ikebukuro, Toshima-ku, Tokyo 171-8501, Japan, Japan
Abstract

We study the extent to which cultural differences in bargaining behavior are context-dependent. In an online experiment, we examine bargaining behavior in the US and Japan using the ultimatum game, questionnaire items, and multiple contextualized scenarios. Our participants were presented with two general questions about negotiation behavior, one about the tendency to negotiate and another about the level of aggressiveness in negotiations. They also played the ultimatum game, making two decisions, one as the proposer and one as the responder. Finally, they responded to questions about 13 different real-life negotiation scenarios, indicating whether they would try to negotiate or not, and in 7 scenarios stating what their proposal to the other party would be. The participants also indicated how frequent each of the negotiation scenarios was in their environment. We found significant cross-country differences in willingness to negotiate in 6 out of the 13 scenarios. In half of these cases, the Americans were more willing to negotiate; in the other half, the Japanese were more willing. We also found significant differences in the level of the proposals to the other party in two out of seven scenarios. Similarly, in one of these cases, the proposals of the Americans were higher, while in the other the Japanese proposed higher amounts. Our analyses show that the differences in negotiation behavior can be partly explained by how frequent the negotiation scenarios are in the participants’ environment. Across the two countries, the questionnaire measure of the general tendency to negotiate highly correlated with the willingness to negotiate in the real-life scenarios. Moreover, our measure of the level of aggressiveness in negotiations significantly correlated with the level of the proposals made in the scenarios. On the contrary, we did not find significant correlations between the ultimatum game behaviors and the responses to the scenarios.

Keywords
Negotiation
Bargaining
Culture
Context Effects
Ultimatum Game
Poster
Elif Tosun - Putting negotiation in context The US vs Japan - Poster.pdf
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