Evolutionary game analysis of the impact of dynamic dual credit policy and carbon tax policy on new energy vehicles

Under the dynamic dual-credit and carbon tax policies, the consumer utility function, the automobile manufacturer profit function, and the evolutionary game model involving the government and automobile manufacturers are constructed, and dual-credit transaction prices are incorporated into the model to analyze the evolutionary stability strategy of automobile manufacturers' production decisions under the dynamic dual-credit policy and carbon tax policy. The results show that 1) the combination of dynamic dual-credit and static carbon tax policies is optimal, and a moderate increase in the carbon tax rate is helpful to improve the enthusiasm of new energy vehicle manufacturers; and 2) when the credit price is around CNY 800, it can best improve the enthusiasm of new energy vehicle manufacturers. Both too-high and too-low prices are not conducive to the market role of the dual-credit policy. Additionally, 3) A higher carbon tax rate is conducive to the rapid development of the new energy vehicle industry in the short term, but it is easy to cause market fluctuations.