Freedom as a Union of Theory and Practice in German Idealism.

This paper explores how German Idealism conceives of freedom not simply as a localized political or moral value, but as the absolute prerequisite for all forms of rational inquiry and systemic knowledge. Freedom is a central concept for philosophy, while remaining contemporary as an unspoken human right. Theoretical inquiry and practical political action are often treated as distinct, fragmented domains. This study argues that the German idealist tradition, especially of Kant’s, Fichte’s and Hegel’s perspective, offers a powerful framework for their philosophical unification, positioning human freedom as the necessary bridge between the cognitive and normative realms.

The research traces this unifying thread through three distinct dialectical stages. Freedom stays in center of German Idealism, a fact that demonstrates its importance to the intellect. First, it examines Kant’s transcendental critique, which establishes that theoretical inquiry is based on an autonomous, self-legislating rational agent. Second, it examines how Fichte in the Wissenschaftslehre, where the self-posited Ich demonstrates that all theoretical consciousness is fundamentally rooted in practical, free activity. Finally, the paper culminates in Hegel’s philosophy of Geist, where abstract subjective freedom achieves its concrete, objective realization within the moral and political institutions of the state.The rational being needs freedom in order to take on a practical existence.

Through this textual and conceptual analysis, the paper demonstrates that for Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, theoretical inquiry cannot exist in isolation from a free subject, just as genuine political practice cannot function without the guiding framework of theoretical discourse. By reformulating freedom as both an epistemological premise and a political goal, the present paper directly contributes to the conference’s theme of the unification of diverse forms of inquiry. Ultimately, he suggests that the contemporary fragmentation in scientific and philosophical inquiry can be reconciled with the recovery of the German idealist notion that the pursuit of truth and the realization of freedom are two aspects of the same rational endeavor.