Prana as the Integrative Principle of Mind–Body Unity: Toward a Unification of Yogic and Phenomenological Modes of Inquiry

Background: The Taittiriya Upanisad and Patanjali's Yoga Sutras (with the Vyasa commentary) both systematize the five-fold kośa (sheath) paradigm, which offers a multi-layered explanation of how the physical, vital, and cognitive parts of selfhood are combined into a single way of being. As part of the Prāṇamaya Kośa, prāṇa serves as an intermediary principle that connects the physical body (Annamaya Kośa) and the cognitive-mental body (Manomaya Kośa). A similar, albeit less nuanced, investigation into this question can be found in Western phenomenology. Explanations of embodiment still rely heavily on Edmund Husserl's distinction between the lived body (Leib) and the physical body (Korper), which was further developed by Merleau-Ponty's idea of the pre-reflective body schema. It does, however, mostly function inside a two-tier system. Although earlier comparative research has started to bridge these traditions—most notably, interpretations of tantric yoga and pranayama through Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology—it has mostly concentrated on practice-level description rather than the ontological architecture of embodiment. Objectives: This study investigates whether prana, as a component of the Prāṇamaya Kośa, serves as a philosophically distinct intermediate category between the cognitive-mental body (Manomaya Kośa) and the physical body (Annamaya Kośa), and whether this category can improve Western phenomenological accounts of embodiment by addressing their inadequate handling of bodily mediation. Material and Methods: This study uses a comparative hermeneutic approach to directly engage philosophically with Husserl's Ideas II and Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception through primary Sanskrit sources (Taittirīya Upaniṣad and Yoga Sūtras, with the Vyāsa commentary). The approach confronts Yoga as a parallel epistemic tradition, reached through contemplative-introspective inquiry, on an equal philosophical footing with the Western phenomenological method, rather than treating it as an ethnographic or religious object of study. Results: The analysis shows that compared to the traditional Leib–Korper distinction, the Pancha Kośa model offers a more complex explanation of embodied experience. Prāṇa appears in this concept as a unique integrative layer connecting conscious awareness to physical processes. Classical Yoga clearly states this intermediary dimension as a fundamental component of human embodiment and experience, in contrast to Western phenomenology, where it is mainly implicit. Conclusion: Prana provides conceptual resources for expanding phenomenological accounts of embodiment beyond their existing binary structure when read philosophically rather than merely physically. By unifying contemplative and analytic-phenomenological modes of inquiry around the common issue of mind-body integration, this comparative reading exemplifies the larger philosophical task this conference addresses. It shows that classical Indian philosophy can make a substantive, rather than merely illustrative, contribution to current discussions in the philosophy of embodiment.