The Limits of Unification: Computational Representation and the Irreducible Other in AI Companionship

As generative AI companionship moves from novelty to a mainstream form of social interaction, recent philosophical debates on the unification of intelligence research have largely overlooked the ontological tensions that arise when human interpersonal relations are framed as computable vector representations. This paper addresses a core metaphilosophical question: whether computational modeling of human connection expands philosophical inquiry, or erases the constitutive conditions of authentic intersubjective encounter. Integrating transcendental phenomenological frameworks from Levinas, Buber, and MacIntyre with structural analysis of mainstream AI companion design mechanisms—including representational reduction, preference fitting, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG)-based memory, and reinforcement learning from human feedback—this study advances a three-dimensional ontological critique of the simulated Other. Empirical material from semi-structured interviews with 20 regular users of conversational AI companions serves as phenomenological fulfillment rather than independent proof. The analysis demonstrates that AI companionship rests on a structural co-implication of two operations: encoding interpersonal alterity into quantifiable computational vectors, and optimizing interaction toward frictionless preference satisfaction. This dual mechanism systematically erodes three foundational prerequisites of genuine human relation. First, it dissolves existential vulnerability by treating uncertainty, emotional risk, and mutual forgiveness as algorithmic inefficiencies to be eliminated. Second, it flattens the Other's radical irreducibility into a self-confirming echo, dissolving the alterity-resistance required for subject formation. Third, it virtualizes shared practice, simulating relational memory while eliminating the independent moral witness required for narrative identity. The study extends MacIntyre's theory of social practice to digital environments and reinterprets Levinas's notion of the face under algorithmic simulation. It argues that forced disciplinary unification between computational science and relational philosophy entails irreversible ontological loss: reducing lived intersubjectivity to computational representation is not neutral interdisciplinary integration but an erasure of ethical alterity. The paper proposes "relational safety" as an independent regulatory dimension and "ethical friction"—deliberate delays, inserted disagreement, and non-optimized memory—as a human-centered design remedy. By delineating exactly where the unification of intelligence studies with phenomenological ethics becomes ontological erasure, this research clarifies the proper limits of cross-domain inquiry.