The Zhuangzi is often interpreted as advocating a transcendence or even rejection of bodily existence because of its repeated discussions of “forgetting form” (wang xing 忘形), “leaving form and knowledge behind” (li xing qu zhi 離形去知), and the transformation of ordinary perception. However, this interpretation encounters an important textual difficulty: while the Zhuangzi emphasizes the overcoming of attachment to bodily form, it also repeatedly stresses preserving life, nourishing oneself, and avoiding harm to one’s own body. This paper argues that the Zhuangzi does not reject the body but distinguishes between two different dimensions of bodily existence represented by the concepts of xing (形) and shen (身).
Focusing primarily on the chapter “De Chong Fu” (德充符), while also examining relevant passages from “Ren Jian Shi” (人間世), “Yang Sheng Zhu” (養生主), “Qi Wu Lun” (齊物論), and “Da Zong Shi” (大宗師), this paper proposes that xing refers mainly to the visible, identifiable, and socially evaluated aspect of human existence. As the stories of mutilated figures in “De Chong Fu” demonstrate, bodily appearance can become an object of social judgment, leading people to associate physical form with moral worth. Zhuangzi’s critique of xing is therefore not a rejection of physical existence itself, but a criticism of treating visible form as the ultimate measure of human value.
By contrast, shen refers to the embodied self that experiences, acts, cultivates, and participates in relationships with the world. The preservation of shen does not mean maintaining an intact physical appearance, but sustaining the dynamic coherence of life through appropriate responses to changing circumstances. The example of Cook Ding in “Yang Sheng Zhu” further shows that bodily transformation and skilled action are achieved not through abandoning the body but through a deeper integration of perception, movement, and the environment.
Finally, this paper examines the phrase “de does not take form” (de bu xing 德不形) in “De Chong Fu.” It argues that virtue in the Zhuangzi should not be understood as an inner spiritual substance separated from the body. Rather, virtue emerges through embodied existence and becomes manifest in relationships and interactions with others. Therefore, “forgetting form” does not indicate abandoning embodiment; instead, it means freeing life from the domination of externally fixed images and social evaluations.
This study contributes to comparative philosophy by challenging the common opposition between body and spirit in interpretations of early Chinese thought. The Zhuangzi presents a distinctive account of embodiment in which transformation, cultivation, and freedom occur through, rather than beyond, bodily existence.