The study of intelligence—whether human, artificial, or non-human—is shaped by epistemic frameworks that define knowledge, reasoning, and cognition. However, these frameworks are not neutral or universally inclusive. Drawing on feminist epistemology and the philosophy of science, this paper examines how dominant definitions of intelligence prioritize androcentric, rationalist, and computational paradigms, marginalizing embodied, affective, and relational forms of knowledge. This epistemic exclusion reinforces a restricted ontology of intelligence aligned with Western, masculinist conceptions of reason, disqualifying alternative intelligence systems, such as those found in artificial systems and collective cognition. Furthermore, it perpetuates a hierarchy wherein calculability, abstraction, and formal logic are valued over contextual, relational, and situated intelligences.

This exclusion is not merely a methodological limitation but a form of epistemic injustice that aligns intelligence with historically dominant, androcentric, and Eurocentric paradigms, silencing embodied and affective epistemologies. Feminist epistemologists have long critiqued how knowledge systems reinforce hierarchical exclusions, particularly in defining intelligence. They highlight how dominant epistemic frameworks privilege certain forms of cognition, such as formal logic, over other modes of knowing that are embodied and relational (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1991). This paper extends these critiques to intelligence studies, arguing that the epistemic frameworks guiding AI research, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind reproduce structural biases that restrict our understanding of intelligence.

In response, the paper proposes a pluralist epistemology of intelligence that recognizes the cognitive diversity of both human and non-human systems. Intelligence should not be confined to traditional models of centralized, rule-based reasoning but must also encompass distributed, ecological, and embedded forms of cognition. This shift challenges conventional exclusions and expands the scope of intelligence research, opening space for non-human, artificial, and collective intelligences (Castán et al., 2021). This requires rethinking not only the ontological status of intelligence but also its epistemic foundations. Integrating feminist epistemology, posthumanist perspectives, and theories of distributed cognition offers a pathway toward a more inclusive and interdisciplinary study of intelligence.

This paper contributes to philosophical debates within intelligence studies, particularly regarding the epistemological, axiological, and ontological status of intelligence. It critiques the assumption that intelligence is best understood through rationalist and formal-logical paradigms, advocating instead for a pluralist, inclusive framework that recognizes diverse forms of cognition. Rethinking intelligence through an epistemically just framework is not only a conceptual necessity but also an ethical imperative, as the way we define intelligence determines whose knowledge is valued, whose cognition is recognized, and whose agency is acknowledged.

References:

• De Togni, G., Erikainen, S., Chan, S., & Cunningham-Burley, S. (2021). What makes AI ‘intelligent’ and ‘caring’? Exploring affect and relationality across three sites of intelligence and care. Social Science & Medicine, 277, 113874.
  
  
• Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Clarendon Press.
  
  
• Haraway, D. (1988). Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective. Feminist Studies, 14(3), 575–599. https://doi.org/10.2307/3178066
  
  
• Harding, S. (1991). Whose science? Whose knowledge?: Thinking from women's lives. Cornell University Press.