Please login first
Analysis on Fractional-order Asymmetric games with varying interaction rates
1  Department of mathematics university of tiaret Algeria, Algeria
Academic Editor: Isamu Okada

Abstract:

Introduction:

Complex adaptive systems (CASs) consist of interacting adaptive agents whose collective behavior leads to emergent properties not found in individual components and not caused by external forces. Examples include the brain, immune system, and economy. Understanding such systems requires a holistic approach rather than traditional reductionism. Due to their memory and nonlocal behavior, fractional differential equations are well-suited for modeling CASs. However, studies on fractional-order CASs remain limited. In this paper, we investigate the existence, uniqueness, equilibrium points, and uniform stability of fractional-order differential equations in games with non-uniform interaction rates.

Method and results: Let image.png image.png exist and be bounded on D. Condition (2) implies that the functions fi satisfy the Lipschitz condition image.png where image.png and image.png.

Theorem 1: (Existence and uniqueness) Let the assumptions (1)-(2) be satisfied. Then, the initial value problem image.png has a unique solution image.png.

Theorem 2: (Games with non-uniform interaction rates) Let image.png. Then, the initial value problem image.png has a unique solution image.png.

Theorem 3: (Asymmetric games) The initial value problem image.png with the initial data image.png has a unique solution image.png.

Conclusion: The results confirm solution reliability for diverse fractional game models with complex interaction structures.

Keywords: Fractional differential equations, Game theory, Asymmetric games, Games with non-uniform interaction rate
Comments on this paper
Currently there are no comments available.


 
 
Top