We introduce the Guaranteed Utility Equilibrium (GUE), a strategy profile where each player secures a utility guarantee regardless of the other players' strategies, and the sum of these guarantees equals the highest achievable total utility. GUE possesses several desirable properties that the Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (DSE) lacks, such as collusion-proofness and robustness under repeated play. GUE also ensures that all Bayesian Nash Equilibria are utility-equivalent to the GUE profile. Particularly in dynamic games, GUE arises more frequently than DSE. For instance, a GUE exists in every finite two-player zero-sum game. Furthermore, a stronger version of the core result of the No-Trade Theorem is a direct consequence of the ``no-trade'' strategy profile constituting a GUE. Perhaps the only significant property of DSE not shared by GUE is that a GUE profile is not necessarily a DSE. For mechanism design, however, this distinction is a crucial advantage, as it allows for GUE-implementation in problems where a DSE-implementation of efficiency is impossible; the mechanism in \cite{CLRT}, for instance, is a GUE-implementation in a problem of this kind. The concept also extends naturally to an approximate version ($\eps$-GUE), which is particularly useful in transfer-free mechanism design.