Parliamentary oversight is a cornerstone of democratic accountability, intended to ensure that the executive remains answerable to the legislature and, by extension, to the public (Calland, 2019). In South Africa, portfolio committees serve as key instruments for this oversight function. However, the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture—commonly known as the Zondo Commission—revealed that these committees largely failed to prevent or detect the systemic corruption that characterized the era of state capture (Zondo Commission, 2022). A qualitative document analysis will be used to examine the structural, political, and institutional factors that contributed to the weakness of parliamentary oversight. Therefore, this study aims to critically examine the weaknesses of parliamentary portfolio committees in exercising effective oversight and accountability in South Africa, as revealed by the Zondo Commission, and to propose strategies for strengthening their institutional capacity, independence, and effectiveness in promoting democratic governance. Drawing on findings from the Zondo Commission and comparative governance literature, the paper argues for a reimagining of the oversight role of portfolio committees to strengthen their effectiveness and autonomy. It proposes reforms including enhanced research support, depoliticization of committee leadership, and institutional mechanisms for public participation and transparency. These recommendations aim to restore confidence in Parliament’s watchdog role and reinforce democratic governance. Ultimately, the study highlights that rebuilding South Africa’s accountability framework requires not only institutional redesign but also a renewed culture of ethical leadership and constitutional fidelity (Madonsela, 2022).