Introduction

This research explores young people's uses and perceptions of social media and mobile technologies as a form of surveillance enabling technologies ; i.e. technologies that were not originally designed for surveillance but can be used for these ends. It investigates the place of these technologies within young people’s interpersonal relationships, as well as the social impacts of the increased capacities for checking', 'looking up' and 'searching', that these technologies provide, potentially leading to a normalisation of such practices. This paper will give an overview of my first empirical findings as well as focus on theoretical insights within current debates on Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), power, and personal relationships.

The project adopts a nuanced approach to surveillance by looking at social media and digital technologies, neither through the framework of empowerment and participation (Albrechtslund, 2008), nor solely through the framework of control and threat (e.g. social control, commercial and state surveillance). Both approaches overlook the duality between agency and wider social structures at play within these technologies. My research focuses on these technologies a means of social sorting and of normalisation of surveillance practices embedded in wider neo-liberal dynamics (e.g. assimilation of work and play (Sennett, 1998, Wittel, 2001), processes of self-responsibility and individualisation). It has been argued that these dynamics lead to more commodified forms of interpersonal relationships (Sennett, 1998, Wittel, 2001, Andrejevic 2007). My research, therefore, investigates surveillance practices in interpersonal relationships but also importantly looks at the shifting perceptions, discourses and legitimacy of these practices in everyday life (Andrejevic, 2007, Jansson, 2012).

According to Andrejevic (2007), continuous and normalised interactions with surveillance processes and technologies make possible the emergence of a 'culture of peer-to-peer monitoring that mimics and amplifies top–down forms of commercial and political surveillance’ (Ibid. : 213). This culture, according to him, is deeply embedded within a broader neo-liberal governance in everyday life where relationships have become managed, optimised, and risks have been reduced. A peer to peer monitoring culture is said to have emerged as a response to increasing uncertainties and perceived risks and a need to pro-actively anticipate them. Thus 'the perceived need for verification increases' (Ibid.), alongside a responsibility of not 'being duped', which helps create a culture of suspicion. These dynamics are arguably not new but they are said to be exacerbated and facilitated by the proliferation of technologies of surveillance and verification, as well of uncertainties and wider political and commercial structures of power that seep into everyday life. Thus this research focuses on surveillance as a socially constructed phenomenon that is embedded in young people's lives through these technologies, as well as a reflection of wider political and commercial structures of power that seep into everyday life.

David Lyon (2001) argues that surveillance relates to "the development of new kinds of solidarity, involving less "trust" or at least different kinds of "trust" (109ff). This research aims to explore whether or not digitally mediated practices involve less 'trust' in interpersonal relationships and what the new modalities of 'different kinds of trust' are. Indeed these technologies, that can be used as means of assessment and verification, can have an important impact on gaining and giving trust first in commercial and work settings (e.g. consumers' reviews on commercial websites, targeted advertising, collection of consumers' data, employers looking up future employees, etc.) as well as in permeating into interpersonal relationships. This has been coined as a 'surveillance creep' (Trottier, 2012), i.e. the spread of surveillance practices from one context to another, and as a consequence normalising these practices.

Technologies that enable and enhance surveillance both shape and are shaped by social interactions. Van Dijck argues that sociality becomes technical due to technological capacities to manipulate and manage social connections through social media (2013: 12). However; to avoid the pitfall of techno-determinism, this research looks at how ICTs reinforce and shape social practices as much as how they are shaped by the wider social and economical context within which they have proliferated. Peer scrutiny is not a new phenomenon in interpersonal relationships, but within a specific social and political agenda alongside the widespread of these technologies, interpersonal relationships are said to become more and more commodified. A common argument is that mutual disclosure, and peer scrutiny (understood as a form of care and control) participate in an information exchange upon which social bonds are based (Wittel, 2001). However, this contributes to justifying such practices and rests upon the idea of 'one have nothing to hide', reinforcing surveillance, the pressing need of disclosure and justifications in different contexts. Moreover, these discourses have impacted on normalising surveillance practices as legitimate and even as a responsible conduct to adopt. This therefore reshapes interpersonal relations and social bonds by means of the introduction of and proliferation of acts such as cross checking and surveillance-like verification.

This research aims to uncover whether such practices are embedded and routinised within young people's interpersonal relationships, and how they reshape social practices. The proliferation of social media and mobile technologies coincides with the extension and individualisation of young people’s transitions to adulthood (Furlong & Cartmel, 1997), and is embedded within wider social and economical dynamics (e.g. expansion of education, mix of work and study, increasing flexibility in the labour market, desynchronisation of young people's schedules (Woodman, 2012, 2013)), as well as particularities of age, class, nationality and gender. The research uses semi-structured interviews with young people aged 16-25 to examine how these technologies, through social media platforms such as Instagram, Twitter and Facebook, and mobile devices, are used as a resource or obstacle to develop and maintain interpersonal relationships (e.g. with school peers, work colleagues, flatmates, friends), as well as their contributions to particular forms of socialising in young people's everyday lives.

References

Albrechtslund, A., Online social networking as a practice based on participatory surveillance, in First Monday, 2008, 13(3)

Andrejevic, M., iSpy: Surveillance and Power in the Interactive Era. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007.

Andrejevic, M., The work of watching one another: Lateral surveillance, risk, and governance. in Surveillance & Society, 2005, 2(4), 479-497.

Beck, U., Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, London, Sage Publications, 1992.

Bourdieu, P. Practical reason: On the theory of action. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1998.

Bourdieu, P. The logic of practice. Translated by Richard Nice. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1990.

Fuchs, C. Web 2.0, Prosumption, and Surveillance in Surveillance & Society, 2011, 8(3): 288-309.

Furlong, A. and Cartmel, F. Young People and Social Change: Individualisation and Risk in the Age of High Modernity, Open University Press, Buckingham, 2007 [1997].

Jansson, A. Perceptions of surveillance: Reflexivity and trust in a mediatized world in European Journal of Communication , 2012, 27(4) 410–427

Lyon, D. and D. Trottier, Key Features of Social media Surveillance in Fuchs, Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media, Routledge, 2011.

Sennett, R., The Corrosion of Character, The Personal Consequences Of Work In the New Capitalism, Norton, London, 1998.

Trottier, D., Social Media as Surveillance, Rethinking Visibility in a Converging World, Ashgate, Surrey, 2012.

van Dijck, J., The Culture of Connectivity A Critical History of Social Media, Oxford University Press, 2013.

Wittel, A., Toward a Network Sociality in Theory, Culture & Society, 2001, 18 (6), 51-76

Woodman, D. Life out of Synch: How New Patterns of Further Education and the Rise of Precarious Employment Are Reshaping Young People’s Relationships in Sociology, 2012 vol. 63, issue 4.

Woodman, D., 'Young people’s friendships in the context of non-standard work patterns', in Economic and Labour Relations Review, Centre for Applied Economic Research, 2013, vol. 24, issue 3.

In this contribution I shall provide, using the example of social media, reasoning for the following theses: a) To work of being watched is a relevant aspect of contemporary informational capitalism; b) capital controls the work of being watched; and c) from this control follows a structural privacy crisis.

Online participation leaves data traces on the Internet. These traces promise to be a profitable business in a growing “surveillance-driven culture production” (Turow 2011). There is a strong nexus between data creating online activity and commercial profits. Personal information is emerging as a new class of assets and it “is becoming a new type of raw material that’s on par with capital and labour” (World Economic Forum 2011, 7). Mark Andrejevic supports this perspective by contending that “whatever the debates going on in the world of orthodox materialism, the business world understands this as work that generates demographic commodities to be bought and sold” (2004, 114). At least, it is fruitful (Mosco 2009, 138) but also theoretically justifiable to speak of this activity as work (Fuchs and Sevignani 2013), namely the specific “work of being watched” (Andrejevic 2004).

This form of work is an instance of what Post-Operaists have termed “immaterial labour” (Lazzarato 1996; Virno 2004) in order to grasp changes of work particularly through the ubiquity of new information and communication technologies. This theoretical school suggests that the subjective aspects in the work process, that is labour power, become dominant positions in comparison to the instrument and products of labour that are controlled by capital. They speak about the dominance of living labour over dead labour that would legitimate calling informational or cognitive capitalism a third stage in capitalism’s development, succeeding mercantile and industrial stages (Boutang 2012, 50; Vercellone 2007). This third stage of capitalist development would erode the real subsumption of labour forces under capital and would be much more similar to the age when capitalism rose and had only formally subsumed labour forces under its control. „Industry does not form or create this new labor power, but simply takes it on board and adapts it” (Lazzarato 1996, 137).

In this presentation, I will challenge this Post-Operaist autonomy thesis in respect to the work of being watched. First, users are forced to work online and, second, they experience capital control during their work. Users are legally independent actors that consent to Internet services’ terms of use and no authority forces them to use a particular service. I would, however, argue that they are also free from the means of communication and surveillance, which exercises force over them to use at least one of the available commercial services in a highly concentrated Internet to be able to benefit from its various functions and generally to socialise and live a good thus connected life under given circumstances. Users are forced to contract their privacy. On the other hand, I will argue that due to accumulated money and network power capital is be able to set the terms of using the Internet by determining online information flows, e.g. on social media wall pages, and clicking behaviour according to their business interests.

Capital control of online activity is likely to raise privacy concerns because it usually entails an intimate relationship to the product for the user and also an intimate relationship to the co-workers. Capital control simultaneously denotes that users lose some control over their data and the setting within which they communicate and collaborate. Consequently, thus privacy crises are immanent to the capitalist organisation of the Internet and they are a place where capitalism comes into conflict with its own bourgeois values. I qualify the privacy contract as a “political fiction” (Pateman and Mills 2007, 17-18; see also Ellerman 2010, 583) that enables “civil subordination” (Pateman 2002). It is a fiction to assume that users can exchange their personal data and that this exchange would not affect their person. A disembodied piece of data property is not what is required by capital; privacy or personal data cannot be separated from the person. Collected data must have a relation to a user since the user is a potential buyer of a product in the view of the advertising corporations. I think whether privacy is alienable, a “contested commodity” (Radin 1987; 1996a), or simply inalienable, is a historical construct and depends on social struggles just like the movement for democracy has rendered certain contracts impossible. And it looks like that capital prevails in these struggles?

References and Notes

1. Andrejevic, M. Reality TV: The work of being watched. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, MD, 2004.
2. Boutang, Y.M. Cognitive capitalism. Polity: Cambridge, UK, 2012.
3. Ellerman, D. Translatio versus concessio: Retrieving the debate about contracts of alienation with an application to today’s employment contract. Politics & Society 2005, 3, 449–80.
4. Mosco, V. The political economy of communication. Sage: London, UK, 2009.
5. Fuchs, C.; Sevignani S. What is digital labour? What is digital work? What’s their difference? And why do these questions matter for understanding social media? tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 2013, 2, 237–93.
6. Lazzarato, M. Immaterial labor. In Radical thought in Italy: A potential politics; Virno, P., Hardt, M., Eds.; University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, MN, 1996, pp. 133–48.
7. Turow, J. The daily you: How the new advertising industry is defining your identity and your worth. Yale University Press; New Haven, CT, 2011.
8. Patemann, C.; Mills C.W. Contract and domination. Polity: Cambridge, UK, 2007.
9. Pateman, C. Self-ownership and property in the person: Democratization and a tale of two concepts. Journal of Political Philosophy 2002, 1, 20–53.
10. Radin, M.J. Contested commodities. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1996.
11. Vercellone, C. From formal subsumption to general intellect: Elements for a Marxist reading of the thesis of cognitive capitalism. Historical Materialism 2007, 15, 13–36.
12. Virno, P. A grammar of the multitude: For an analysis of contemporary forms of life; Semiotext(e): Los Angeles, CA, 2004.

Future progress of new information processing devices capable of dealing with problems such as big data, Internet of things, semantic web, cognitive robotics, neuroinformatics and similar, depends on the adequate and efficient models of computation. We argue that defining computation as information transformation, and given that there is no information without representation, the dynamics of information on the fundamental level is physical/ intrinsic/ natural computation (Dodig-Crnkovic, 2011) (Dodig-Crnkovic, 2014). Intrinsic natural computation occurs on variety of levels of physical processes, such as the levels of computation of living organisms as well as designed computational devices. The present article is building on our typology of models of computation as information processing (Burgin & Dodig-Crnkovic, 2013). It is indicating future paths for the advancement of the field, expected both as a result of the development of new computational models and learning from nature how to better compute using information transformation mechanisms of intrinsic computation.

Complexity of the Concept of Computation and Information Transformation

In a variety of fields, researchers have been searching for a common definition of computation, from (Turing, 1936)(Kolmogorov, 1953)(Copeland, 1996)(Burgin, 2005) to (Denning, 2010)(Denning, 2014)(Burgin & Dodig-Crnkovic, 2011) and (Hector Zenil, 2012)(Dodig-Crnkovic & Giovagnoli, 2013). Some of these studies of computation are done in an informal setting based on hands-on and research practice, as well as on philosophical and methodological considerations. Yet other research approaches strive to build exact mathematical models to comprehensively describe computation (Denning, 2014). When the Turing machine (or Logical Computing Machine as Turing originally named his logical device) was constructed and accepted as an universal computational model, it was considered as a complete and exact definition of computation (Church-Turing thesis) (Burgin, 1987). However, the absolute nature of the Turing machine was questioned by contemporary research (Cooper, 2012) (Cooper & Leeuwen, 2013) and challenged by adopting a more general formal definition of algorithm (Burgin, 2005).

Nevertheless, in spite of all efforts, the conception of computation remains too vague and ambiguous. This vagueness of the foundations of computing has resulted in a variety of approaches, including approaches that contradict each other. Abramsky summarizes the process of successive change of models of computation and their future perspectives as follows:

“Traditionally, the dynamics of computing systems, their unfolding behavior in space and time has been a mere means to the end of computing the function which specifies the algorithmic problem which the system is solving. In much of contemporary computing, the situation is reversed: the purpose of the computing system is to exhibit certain behaviour. (…) We need a theory of the dynamics of informatic processes, of interaction, and information flow, as a basis for answering such fundamental questions as: What is computed? What is a process? What are the analogues to Turing completeness and universality when we are concerned with processes and their behaviours, rather than the functions which they compute? (Abramsky, 2008)

Abramsky emphasizes that there is the need for second-generation models of computation, and in particular process models. The first generation models of computation originated from problems of formalization of mathematics and logic, while processes or agents, interaction, and information flow are results of recent developments of computers and computing. In the second-generation models of computation, previously isolated systems are replaced by processes and agents for which the interactions with each other and with the environment are fundamental. Hewitt too advocates an agent-type, Actor model of computation (Hewitt, 2012) which is suitable for modeling of physical (intrinsic) computation.

In the historical perspective, the development of the concept of computation on the practical level related to operations performed by people and physical objects used as computing devices, while on the theoretical level computation was represented by abstract models and processes.

Variety of current approaches to the concept of computation shows remarkable complexity that makes communication of related results and ideas increasingly difficult. We explicated present diversity of concepts and models in (Burgin & Dodig-Crnkovic, 2013) to highlight the necessity of establishing relationships and common understanding. The analysis of the present state of the art allowed us to discover basic structures inherent for computation and to develop a multifaceted typology of computations. We presented the structural framework of information processing and computation with triadic relationships between (information processing (computation), algorithm and device/agent); (data, context/environment and function/goal); (structure, physical and mental/cognitive); (program, device and data), etc. Those are combined to form action computation pyramid with ((data, device/agent, program) and information processing/computation). An effective methodology of our approach is to find essential features of computation with the goal to explicate its nature and to build adequate models for research and technology. Our conclusion is that different models of computation may have their specific uses and applications, and it is necessary to understand their mutual relationships and the assumptions under which they apply in order to be able to consistently use them.

We underline several topics of importance for the development of new understanding of computing and its role: natural computation and the relationship between the model and physical implementation, interactivity as fundamental for computational modeling of concurrent information processing systems such as living organisms and their networks, and the new developments in modeling needed to support this generalized framework.

In such a way, we achieve better understanding of computation as information processing than we had before. As there is no information without (physical) representation (Landauer, 1996), the dynamics of information in nature is implemented on different levels of granularity by different physical processes, including the level of computation performed by computing machines (designed computation), as well as by living organisms (intrinsic computation) (Dodig-Crnkovic, 2014).

There are still many open problems related to the nature of information and computation, as well as to their relationships. How is information dynamics implemented/represented in computational systems, in machines, as well as in living organisms? Are computers processing only data or information or can they be made to process knowledge as well? What do we know of computational processes in machines and living organisms and how these processes are related? What can we learn from natural computational processes that can be useful for the development of information systems and knowledge management?

Our aim is to contribute to the future development by the exposition and delimitation of possibilities of the unified concept of computation understood as information processing (information transformation).

References and Notes

Abramsky, S. (2008). Information, Processes and Games. In J. Benthem van & P. Adriaans (Eds.), Philosophy of Information (pp. 483–549). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North Holland.

Burgin, M. (1987). The Notion of Algorithm and the Turing-Church Thesis. In Proc. of the VIII International Congress on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, v.5 part 1 (pp. 138–140).

Burgin, M. (2005). Super-Recursive Algorithms. New York: Springer-Verlag New York Inc.

Burgin, M., & Dodig-Crnkovic, G. (2011). Information and Computation – Omnipresent and Pervasive. In Information and Computation (pp. vii –xxxii). New York/London/Singapore: World Scientific Pub Co Inc.

Burgin, M., & Dodig-Crnkovic, G. (2013). Typologies of Computation and Computational Models. Arxiv.org, arXiv:1312.

Cooper, S. B. (2012). The Mathematician’s Bias - and the Return to Embodied Computation. In H. Zenil (Ed.), A Computable Universe: Understanding and Exploring Nature as Computation. World Scientific Pub Co Inc.

Cooper, S. B., & Leeuwen, J. van. (2013). Alan Turing. His work and impact. Elsevier Science.

Copeland, B. J. (1996). What is computation? Synthese, 108(3), 335–359.

Denning, P. (2010). What is computation?: Editor’s Introduction. Ubiquity, (October), 1–2.

Denning, P. (2014). Structure and Organization of Computing. In J. Tucker, A., Gonzalez, T., Topi, H. and Diaz-Herrera (Ed.), Computing Handbook. Computer Science and Software Engineering. Chapman & Hall/CRC.

Dodig-Crnkovic, G. (2011). Dynamics of Information as Natural Computation. Information, 2(3), 460–477.

Dodig-Crnkovic, G. (2014). Modeling Life as Cognitive Info-Computation. In A. Beckmann, E. Csuhaj-Varjú, & K. Meer (Eds.), Computability in Europe 2014. LNCS (pp. 153–162). Berlin Heidelberg: Springer.

Dodig-Crnkovic, G., & Giovagnoli, R. (2013). Computing Nature. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer.

Hewitt, C. (2012). What is computation? Actor Model versus Turing’s Model. In H. Zenil (Ed.), A Computable Universe, Understanding Computation & Exploring Nature As Computation. World Scientific Publishing Company/Imperial College Press.

Kolmogorov, A. N. (1953). On the Concept of Algorithm. Russian Mathematical Surveys, 8(4), 175–176.

Landauer, R. (1996). The Physical Nature of Information. Physics Letter A, 217, 188.

Turing, A. M. (1936). On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungs problem. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 42(42), 230–265. doi:10.1112/plms/s2-42.1.23

Zenil, H. (2012). A Computable Universe. Understanding Computation & Exploring Nature As Computation. (H. Zenil, Ed.). Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company/Imperial College Press.

Introduction

In recent years the speeches about the democratizing potential of the Internet and social networks have been proliferating. The theoretical spectrum of all these speeches ranges from consideration of the Internet and social networks as complement of the procedures and techniques used by representative democracy (as "digital democracy") up to their potential to generate new forms of citizenship in the way towards new direct democracy. The analysis which takes place here explores to what extent the Internet and social networks are changing the relations and attitudes civic between governments and citizenship, even if, indeed, represent another form of constructing citizenship and democratic political participation through social mobilization, moving towards strong and direct sense of democracy and even the possibility of arriving at self-participatory government.

Or, rather, we are faced with a certain idealization of the great potential of the Internet and social networking, where mythical speeches that anticipate the desirable uses of these tools in the field of social and political participation arise. Perhaps, we just deal with a digital activism, obsessed by the clicks made on the Internet and social networks in favour of a cause, that you are introducing high doses of trivialization practice of civic commitment, delimited and domesticated commercially by the owners of this virtual cyberspace who control the possibilities and the limits of a captive "pseudocitizenship" in the kingdom of the cyberspace. In short, we can say that the Internet and social networks can lead to boom or to doom: they can lead to the materialization of the technological utopias of a more egalitarian world or, conversely, can reproduce and further exacerbate the imbalances of power that already exists in the social reality. This is the challenge, this is the defiance. The future is being built with the networks we are creating.

Results and Discussion

The Internet: Participation or trivialization of civic engagement?. –Here we will contemplate to what extent the Internet and social networks are changing the relationship between government and citizenship - whether they represent another way of building citizenship and democratic political participation through social mobilization, advancing towards strong, direct democracy and even the possibility of participatory self-government or if we rather have a certain idealization on the great potential of the Internet and social networks, where civic engagement is bounded and domesticated commercially by the owners of this virtual cyberspace that are those who control the possibilities and limits of a "pseudociudadania" captive in the realm of cyberspace(Hurtado y Naranjo, 2002).

Democracy digital 4.0.- One of these is Democracy 4.0. (2012), supported by Democracy Real Ya (DRY) initiative. This initiative proposes that citizens participate from home directly via the Internet in making decisions that affect them. The truth is that the participation in social networks is changing the landscape of the democratic practices from the role of political parties and their usage of the networks during their campaigns and in the subsequent political work up to the pressure through networks (e.g. the case of wikileaks) in favour of greater transparency of governments, banks and major multinationals and their practices.

The participation on the Internet: beyond the Slack-clickactivismo.-the “brecha digital” not only of access to web 1.0 (access to the Internet - seniors, rural areas, countries of the South, etc.), but Web 2.0 (which produces content and relationships in cyberspace) requires us to ask ourselves if really the access to the network is democratized, and whether the content production has become democratized. "Clickactivismo" is digital activism that tends to embrace the ideology of marketing without too much criticism. Obsessed by the pursuit of the clicks made on the Internet for a cause or an ONG, accepts implicitly that the advertising and market research tactics used for selling toilet paper can also build citizenship. This practice shows an excessive faith in the power of metrics to measure success, 'typical' style of social networks that count the number of "friends" they possess.

The Internet and the Arab spring - It is possible in this context that collective action can flourish in the network. In case of flourishing, we must ask ourselves if it has been a "digital revolution". Let's analyze the example of the so-called "Arab spring". It is true that what happened in Egypt in February of 2011 and ended in the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak seems to point at the Internet and social networks, Facebook and Twitter, as well as the messages via mobile phones according to the information presented in the media. "A revolution of social networks, which makes it possible to advance democracy", it was said by many people who seem to consider the social networking sites as the new weapons that are possessed by the citizens in the streets to confront the power today. These are the cellular text messages (or the messages on Twitter and Facebook) spread by libertarians that transmit relevant information that the media serving the power normally hides".

The utopia of democratic citizenship cybernetics.- One might, therefore, wonder if, despite all its limitations, the appearance of this type of virtual social spaces would decrease the interest in the social and political involvement of youth in Spain. Time will tell if the Internet and social networks will be converted into a tool for empowerment of groups, communities and social movements. If with their help the globalization of the environment and human rights is going to be possible in order to mobilize action, exert pressure, install issues and legitimize dissident voices in national and international agendas, it would be as effective as the globalization of capitalism has been as well as the one of the financial institutions and multinational companies that manage the economy and world politics using the new technologies.

Civic socialization in the social networks.- The concept of citizenship responds to contemporary social responsibility in action (Hobsbawm, 1998), which is exercised by the right to effective decision-making participation in the social, economic and political areas (García Canclini, 1995). We advocate the concept of participatory citizenship suggested by Suarez (2005) who founded the social membership and associated rights which are not so much a formal citizenship - and in many times passive - as in active involvement in the community where he lives. This approach questions the liberal model of citizenship, pointing at the necessary extension of citizenship to a true model of post-national and post-colonial citizenship (Suarez, Macia and Moreno, 2007) moving towards the forms of participatory democracy.

Conclusions

In the final analysis, we can say that the Internet and social networks can lead to the boom or to the doom: on the one hand they can lead to the materialization of technological utopias of a more egalitarian world, on the other hand they can reproduce and further exacerbate the imbalance of power that already exists in the social reality. Networks can be used to entangle (for the construction of networks aimed at social change) or to clutter (for social fragmentation and the dispersion in respect of the strategies for change) (Mari, 2007). New possibilities for participation, access to multiple information sources and the horizontal model of communication generate the space for social interaction that goes beyond the classical cartography and the bodily limits, making it possible to overcome certain physical, social and even psychological and political barriers.

References and Notes

1. Caldevilla Domínguez, D. (2010). Las Redes Sociales. Tipología, uso y consumo de las redes 2.0 en la sociedad digital actual. Documentación de las Ciencias de la Información, 33, 45-68.
2. Castells, M. (2009). Comunicación y poder. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
3. Chomsky, N. (2010). Las 10 principales estrategias de manipulación mediática. [Recuperado el 13 de febrero de 2011 de http://www.cubadebate.cu/opinion/2010/09/15/noam-chomsky-y-las-10-estrategias-de-manipulacion-mediatica/]
4. De Moraes, D. (2004). El activismo en Internet: nuevos espacios de lucha social. [Recuperado el 13 de febrero de 2011 de http://www.rebelion.org/hemeroteca/cibercensura/040202.htm]
5. Del Moral, J.A. (2005). Redes Sociales ¿Moda o nuevo paradigma? Madrid: Asociación de usuarios de Internet.
6. Democracia 4.0. (2012). Democracia Real Ya llama a la ciudadanía a sumarse a la petición de una Democracia 4.0 para ejercer su soberanía [Recuperado el 13 de noviembre de 2012 de http://demo4punto0.net/it/node/15]
7. DíazNafría, J.M., Alfonso Cendón, J., Panizo Alonzo, L. Building up eParticipatorydecisión-making from the local to the global scale. Study case at theEuropeanHigherEducationArea.
8. DíazNafría, J.M. (2015). Ethics at the age of information. System (2015) in press.
9. Díez Rodríguez, A. (2003). Ciudadanía cibernética. La nueva utopía tecnológica de la democracia. En J. Benedicto y M. L. Morán (ed.) Aprendiendo a ser ciudadanos (193-218). Madrid: Injuve.
10. Hurtado Galeano, D. y Naranjo Giraldo, G. (2002). Aprendizajes sociales y pedagogías ciudadanas. Apuntes para repensar la formación de ciudadanía en Colombia. Estudios Políticos, 21, 145-159.
11. Levy, P. (1997). La cibercultura, el segondiluvi? Barcelona: EdiUOC-Proa.
12. Marí, V. M. (2010). Tecnologías de la Información y Gobernanza Digital. Los usos ciudadanos de Internet en el espacio local de Jerez de la Frontera. Historia Actual Online, 21, 173-187.
13. Marí, V. M. (2007). Contra la evaporación de la dimensión política de la comunicación. Movimientos sociales, ONG y usos de Internet. ZER, 22, 453-471.
14. Monbiot, G. (2011). Online astroturfing is more advanced and more automated than we’d imagined. The Guardian, 23 Febrero [http://www.monbiot.com/2011/02/23/robot-wars/ Recuperado el 19 de marzo de 2011].
15. Navarro, V. (2011). Lo que no se conoce sobre Egipto. Público, 17 febrero 2011. [Recuperado el 19 de marzo de 2011 de http://blogs.publico.es/dominiopublico/3047/lo-que-no-se-conoce-sobre-egipto/].
16. Putnam, R. (2009). The myth of digital democracy. New Jersey: Princenton University Press.
17. Van Alstyne, M. y Brynjolfsson, E. (1996). Electronic Communities: Global Village or Cyberbalkans? En J. DeGross, S. Jarvenpaa, y A. Srinivasan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Information Systems.New York: Wiley.

Introduction

Children and teenagers today use digital gadgets and platforms on an everyday basis and they appear to be vigorously motivated to do so. Videogames are one of the most popular types of digital media enjoyed by young people. Most of them seem to choose videogames primarily for being entertained but a growing number of applications (serious and educational games) are geared towards serving educational purposes both inside and outside the school environment.

My proposed talk focuses on the issue of psychological motivations of play. What are the driving forces behind young people’s use of videogames in general and whether, specifically, can those motivations be canalized towards the use of serious or educational games? To put it in other words, is there a chance that good game design will bring videogame players to use educational software and digital learning tools with as much enthusiasm as they immerse themselves in game worlds created for entertainment purposes?

I shall examine this problem by looking at the results of two different studies we made in Hungary, in 2013 and 2014, respectively. One study concerned, among others things, the long-term and short-term motivations of elementary school children playing motion controlled videogames on a voluntary basis. The other was a general and representative survey of videogame playing habits and attitudes among Hungarian youth aged 8-18, taken in 2014. In both cases, uncovering the motivations for play was an important goal of the study.

Obviously, there is a large research tradition aimed at identifying the motivations to play in the case of videogames. One strand of valuable research seems to be more theoretical and intuitive in nature, and has the potential use of games for educational purposes more clearly in sight (e.g. Malone 1980, Prensky 2001, Gee 2003). Another strand is of a more descriptive and empirical kind and typically focuses on exploring the motivations of fans of specific videogame genres such as MMORPGs by using surveys (e.g. Yee 2006, and Olson 2010 for a review). In designing the studies described here we followed the second strand of research and tried to gauge players’ motivations without using predefined categories in the survey questions and thus letting them express their motivations in their own words. But after having interpreted the answers one can see motivating elements emerge that square also with what the first tradition of research proposes as chief motivating factors (e.g. fun and enjoyment, Prensky 2001; fantasy, Malone 1980).

Methods

Please see in next section under (Study 1.) and (Study 2.)

Results and Discussion

(Study 1.) In the framework of a longitudinal study we offered the opportunity for elementary school students in Eger, Hungary (second/third and fifth/sixth graders, age groups 8-9 and 11-12; N = 59), to use motion controlled videogames on XBOX 360 game consoles equipped with a Kinect motion sensor. Starting in March 2013 and finishing in December 2013, students could play Kinect Sports and Kinect Adventures! during school weeks each afternoon but on a voluntary basis, under teacher supervision and filling out a brief survey (‘game diary’) each time they decided to come to play. Teachers were not allowed to play together with the children; they were only present to collect the game diaries and to make sure that gameplay proceeds without disputes. The study aimed at establishing (1) whether the children’s motivation to play the motion controlled games remained constant in a relatively long period of time, i.e., one spanning two school terms; (2) what specific motivations did the children have when they came to play, and (3) whether playing motion controlled games on a regular basis would help children to maintain a healthy lifestyle.

As regards their motivations, we found that despite initial enthusiasm, about two thirds of the children dropped out of the study in the long run and that younger children (2^nd and 3^rd graders) enjoyed playing much more than did their older counterparts (5^th and 6^th graders). In all, we registered 754 occasions when younger students came to play and only 114 when members of the older age group choose to do so.

By looking at the data forthcoming from the game diaries we could also fathom some of the children’s motivation for play. Interestingly, their motivations were not of a sporting or social nature: only on 6,3% of the occasions did the say they ‘enjoyed doing some sport’ and ‘getting tired in a positive way’, just as ‘playing with friends’ as a motivation featured very rarely (2,9%) in the records. Rather, they mentioned on many occasions that they ‘loved to play’ (30,1%) and ‘playing was fun’ or that it put them ‘in a good mood’ (28,8%). Though it is not fully evident exactly what psychological motivations the children referred to when using phrases like these, it seems that on most occasions the participants in our study came to play motion controlled videogames primarily in order to be entertained and to have fun. Note though that this was a small sample and also that motion controlled sports games constitute a specific kind of videogames more on the arcade side, without a rich narrative and fantasy aspects typical of other popular genres such as MMORPGs and action-adventure games (cf. Malone 1980).

Examining the social dimension a bit further one finds that supervising teachers present at the gaming site described the children as helpful to each other on most of the occasions (82,9% of the cases) and the kids themselves reported ‘to have enjoyed playing with a gaming partner a lot’ most of the time (77,2%). In line with this, it was in less than 50% of the gaming occasions that children reported in the game diary that they ‘wanted to win’. This difference might show that the children’s motivation to be competitive was weaker than the intention of being a good sport, i.e. a cooperative playing partner.

(Study 2.) The other study I would like to bring to bear on the issue of gaming motivations was a general survey of videogame playing habits and attitudes among Hungarian youth aged 8-18. It was taken in 2014, between April and June, and was representative for gender, age, place of residence with a sample of over 690 subjects from various elementary and middle schools in Hungary. The participants filled out our online survey under teacher supervision as part of their class. Some questions of the survey concerned motivations for play. For example, participants were asked why they liked playing digital games (including mobile, PC and console games). Among the prominent answers, only one or two seems to be prima facie compatible with the kind of appeal educational games may typically offer. Thus, one of the motivating factors was ‘the opportunity to practise English while playing’ (63,9%), another was ‘to be able to play together with my friends and classmates’ (55,6%), both possibly offered by educational games. Apart from that, respondents stated that what they liked about playing videogames was: ‘the atmospheric and enticing visual aspects of the games’ (64,5%); ‘the pleasant immersion in the game world’ (60,3%); that they can ‘forget about their problems while playing’ (52,7%); that they can ‘let their anger out’ (48,2%); that games are ‘an ideal topic of conversation with friends’ (46,8%); and that in the game they ‘can be someone they cannot be in reality’ (44%).

Similarly, when asked about what features or traits of their favourite avatar and/or favourite game character do they find most attractive, they replied that: they can be ‘stronger or faster than in reality’ (58,7%); can do or accomplish ‘things that are more spectacular than the ones in reality’ (53,4%); that they can be ‘smarter than in reality’ (40%); or even that they can ‘be naughty or behave badly towards others’ (35,4%). On the more positive side, many respondents mentioned that they appreciated their favourite avatar’s or character’s ‘ability to help out others’ (44,7%) as well.

Also, when asked about ‘why is it a good thing to play videogames’, the majority of answers pointed towards amusement and entertainment-seeking rather than learning-related phenomena. For example, 45,3% of respondents mentioned immersion and exploration as the chief merit of games; that one can kill the time by playing them (20%); that playing videogames relieves one’s tension and frustration (18%); and that gaming is a social form of entertainment (4,4%). In all, 7,2% of them said that gaming improves one’s skills or can be used to learn something.

Conclusions

What seems to come forth from these studies is that many aspects of digital games that young people say they like are closely linked to, or even rooted in, the entertaining character of these games (e.g., offering an audio-visual spectacle, exceeding the bounds of reality, to offer the ability to wind down or behave in a naughty manner). And only some of the playing motivations reported or fathomed seem to square more readily with what a serious game or a digital learning tool is likely to offer (e.g. improvement of language skills; and possibly the social and fantasy aspects of play). Thus, getting the playing motivations of young people right and keep those motivations constantly high might prove to be a crucial and difficult task of educational digital games and game designers.

Acknowledgments

Both researches mentioned in this abstract were pursued within the framework of the TÁMOP-4.2.2.C-11/1/KONV-2012-0008 (Social Renewal Operative Program) project titled The application of ICT in learning and knowledge acquisition: Research and Training Program Development in Human Performance Technology in Hungary, at Eszterházy Károly College, Eger. Said project was implemented by the support of the European Union and the co-financing of the European Social Fund. I also thank the anonymous reviewer of the abstract for his valuable comments and suggestions.

References and Notes

1. Malone, T. What makes things fun to learn? Heuristics for designing instructional computer games. In SIGSMALL '80 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGSMALL symposium and the first SIGPC symposium on Small systems; ACM Press: New York, 1980; pp. 162-169.
2. Prensky, M. Digital Game-based Learning; McGraw-Hill: New York, 2001.
3. Gee, J. P. What Video Games Have to Teach Us About Learning and Literacy; Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2003.
4. Yee, N. Motivations for Play in Online Games; CyberPsychology and Behavior 2006, 9, 772-775.
5. Olson, C. K. Children’s motivations for video game play in the context of normal development. Review of General Psychology 2010, 14 (2), 180-187.

Introduction

Information Technology and Communication Infrastructures – commonly referred to as the Cyberspace – have been in the focus of military institutions and secret services from the beginning. Not only was the Internet originally introduced by U.S. military institutions – it emerged from the Arpanet, named after the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) of the U.S. Department of Defense – it also serves as an infrastructure for military action today, being under surveillance by secret services and military agencies to gather information for cyber- and conventional military means and used for cyber attacks in order to compromise the infrastructure of the percepted enemy.

FIfF has launched the Cyberpeace campaign [1] to address the threats emerging from cyber warfare policies and to push back the colonization of the communication infrastructure by the military and surveillance of the entire population, which, in addition, sets everyone under suspicion. Our goals are non-violent conflict resolution, arms control of cyber weapons and surveillance technology, dismissal of development and use of cyber weapons, the obligation to make IT vulnerabilities public and the promotion of communication infrastructure, which is, by law, secure against surveillance. We want the Internet and all infrastructure to be used in a peaceful fashion and to be protected against military misuse. We want that secure communication be ensured while preserving and promoting human and civil rights.

In order to achieve these goals, we focus on four issues we elaborate on in the following chapters:

• Rebuilding trust, which has been seriously affected by the worldwide secret service surveillance recently disclosed. This degradation of trust seriously affects a main resource of political, social and economic cooperation.
• Condemning offensive action and promoting non-violent means of conflict resolution by assuring that nations are not willing, and actually cannot, carry out offensive strikes against each others' vital infrastructure, by mutual agreements and control.
• Securing vital infrastructure by technical means – building up security provisions, which prevent aggressors from infiltrating computer networks and computer systems, which are vital for the supply of a society with basic services, as energy, health care, communication etc.
• Preserving political control, democracy and security by a Cyberpeace initiative on government level, democratic control of the Internet and cyber security strategies and ensuring an demilitarized political language.

This is our framework for the claims we require in our Cyberpeace campaign for a peaceful use of the Internet and all information and communication infrastructures.

Rebuild trust

Our society is based on trust – this is what sociologist Niklas Luhmann pointed out in his book Vertrauen („Trust“) in 1968 [4] – long before the Internet arised to influence our entire life. Luhmann points out, that trust ist essential to reduce the social complexity of our societal environment. This is necessary to enable us to take all the decisions which everyday life requests us to. With a lack of trust, the number of decisions to take would become overwhelming; we would not be able to cope with everyday life. Security expert Bruce Schneier [5] illustrates this convincingly:

„Just today, a stranger came to my door claiming he was here to unclog a bathroom drain. I let him into my house without verifying his identity, and not only did he repair the drain, he also took off his shoes so he wouldn't track mud on my floors. When he was done, I gave him a piece of paper that asked my bank to give him some money. He accepted it without a second glance. At no point did he attempt to take my possessions, and at no point did I attempt the same of him. In fact, neither of us worried that the other would. My wife was also home, but it never occurred to me that he was a sexual rival and I should therefore kill him.“

Using Internet services also requires trust – and we are commonly willing to provide this trust, e.g. by calling web sites, often without double-checking their trustworthiness. We often simply rely on our intuition. We call web sites without encryption, trusting, that nobody would eavesdrop on our communication. Also, we do not encrypt our e-mail – nobody would read along and if so, what could possibly happen?

The recent disclosures should have changed our minds. Edward Snowden provided us with the consciousness of world-wide surveillance of the entire communication by secret services [3]. Authors like Josef Foschepoth [2], Professor of history from the University of Freiburg, made clear that modern mail and communication surveillance started from the end of World War II – not only in the eastern states, but also in the Federal Republic of Germany. Currently, an inquiry committee investigates unconstitutional surveillance by the German federal intelligence service (Bundesnachrichtendienst). Austria, as an example, just filed a case due to punishable espionage – formally against the unknown; actually it clearly affects german authorities.

Trust cannot be enforced by political claims – it grows (and vanishes) due to actual action. Nevertheless, political action is necessary to restore trust and to enforce the demands we derive from the second and third issue mentioned above.

Condemn offensive action and promote non-violent conflict resolution

Real peace is only possible, if all parties abstain from armament and from attacking each other. Since unilateral measures of disarmament lead to the risk of insufficient defense capacities, bilateral or multilateral agreements must be concluded. These agreements should aim at structural inability to attack and the limitation of military capacity to defense. Strict rules must be agreed upon to protect people, if in spite of focusing military strategies on defense, a conflict might arise. In detail, from our point of view the following demands must be requested [1]:

• No offensive or pre-emptive strikes in cyberspace. Of course, each state has the right to defend itself against attacks – cyber attacks as well as conventional attacks. But we reject any kind of offensive attacks, including pre-emptive strikes to circumvent an assumed attack by a potential opponent. We request states to publicly declare to abstain from offensive and pre-emptive cyber strikes and every kind of the offensive use of cyber weapons. Never should economic interests be a legitimate reason for cyber attacks, e.g., assumed violation of intellectual property rights. Governments shall not use cyber weapons for this purpose.
• Exclusively defensive security strategy. Although, of course, all nations have the right to defend themselves against attacks, no nation, in our opinion, has the right to attack itself. So states should maintain a clearly defensive cyber strategy; they should publicly commit not to develop nor use cyber weapons for offensive means.
• Cyber weapons, as all kinds of conventional weapons, are a security threat to everyone, as they may affect all kinds of infrastructure, vital to human life and well-being. Relying on (undisclosed) vulnerabilities, the effect of cyber weapons is not restricted to the target of an attack. Instead, potentially it affects all systems with the specific vulnerabilities exploited for this attack.
• No conventional response to cyber attacks. We do not consider it acceptable, to respond on cyber attacks using conventional weapons. This would cause an escalation of forces which might easily become uncontrollable. In addition, the attacker cannot be easily determined (attribution problem), so the risk of conventional strikes on innocent victims is high.
• Geneva Convention in cyberspace. Critical infrastructure facilities, in a war, are attractive targets, since their failure would fundamentally weaken an enemy. However, failure of infrastructure also seriously affects civil society by attacking life-support facilities like water supply, energy, health care etc. This vital infrastructure for the civil population must not be targeted. From our point of view, a violation of this principle should be considered a war crime. We urge nations and their governments to commit to common principles agreed in international treaties. The Tallinn-Manual might be a start, but it would have to be reworked to emphasize the avoidance of the use of force – e.g., conventional responses on cyber attacks are possible according to the Tallinn-Manual, which we reject.

Secure vital infrastructure

Although we prefer all parties in a conflict to abstain from using military force and employ non-violent means of conflict resolution, we must be aware, that defensive military capacity has to be built up to intervene in cases, when short-term non-violent conflict resolution is not possible and a military cyber attack takes place. Additionally, cyber attacks from non-military origins have to be considered, such as cyber crime and cyber terrorism – a threat strongly expanding. Public authorities and business companies will have to meet sufficient security measures, and constantly update them with regard to the evolution of capacity on the attackers' side. The range spans from script-kiddies, hackers, criminals to secret services with virtually unlimited capacity to set up attacks.

The following demands, from out point of view, are preconditions to make secure system operation possible – they do not guarantee it [1].

• Disclose vulnerabilities. Cyber attacks often rely on undisclosed vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilties are employed for all kinds of cyber attacks – actual cyber attacks, which aim to destroy the infrastructure of an enemy, and each action, which seeks to prepare for war, as the surveillance by secret service authorities. To accomplish this, public authorities might accept and create vulnerabilities and keep them as a secret for future use. At the same time, these undisclosed vulnerabilities might be misused for criminal means. So we request full disclosure of vulnerabilities – within a reasonable timeframe. We expect that disclosed vulnerabilities will be fixed very quickly. This will enhance public awareness and trust in defensive security strategies.
• Protect critical infrastructure. Currently, critical infrastructures are often easily to access from the internet, as they are connected to publicly accessible services. In some cases, it might be reasonable to connect services to the public internet, in order to enhance accessability and quality of public services. Nevertheless, it must be considered, that vulnerabilities are unavoidable in many cases and may be employed to attack by hostile users. So security of critical infrastructure must be verified by competent and transparent audits and tests. Operators of critical infrastructure must be obliged to protect this infrastructure from cyber attacks. They must be obliged to implement and operate secure systems. They must not rely on state authorities or even the military. Wherever possible, critical infrastructure – like nuclear power plants – must be separated from the public internet.
• Establish cyber security centers. Facilities are required, which ensure to deal with threats from cyberspace effectively and implement appropriate instruments to provide and enhance cyber security. They must be organized in a way which preserves fundamental civil and human rights. So these cyber security centers must be established to deal with cyber threats effectively. They must be consequently peace-oriented and work in a transparent fashion. Separation between police, intelligence and military authorities must be provided.
• Promote (junior) IT experts. Today, there is a lack of IT experts and knowledge for effective protection from cyber attacks in Europe. This is even increased due to IT experts working for compromising IT systems instead of improving their security. So the quality of IT products – particularly with regard to IT security – must be enhanced significantly to reduce their vulnerability. Governmental authorites and economic enterprises should invest in qualified junior experts for IT in general and IT security in particular. Academic education must be broadened to cover ethical and political aspects as well as the assessment of technological impact.
• Promote Open Source. In contrast to proprietary software, open source software may allow independent inspections and reviews. This reduces the probability of back-doors significantly. In principle, the entire community can conduct these reviews. So open Source software should be promoted and used by governmental authorities. It should be preferred particularly for critical infrastructure. Governmental authorities should also promote independent reviews and inspections. Nevertheless, we have to be aware, that open source is not the solution to all our security challenges – it is not sufficient, that it is virtually possible to inspect systems and find its vulnerabilities – reviews must be conducted in practice by competent reviewers, and sufficient resources must be granted to achieve the effort necessary. But still, there is no guarantee to eliminate all vulnerabilities critical to confidentiality, integrity and availability of the systems.

Preserve democratic political control

The demands mentioned before need sufficient attention on the political level. Organisational and legislative measures must be taken to promote confidentiality, integrity and availability, bring forward democratic control and civil rights such as free speech, and, last but not least, take care of appropriate political language [1].

• Cyberpeace initiative on government level. From our point of view, the cyberspace – viz. all kinds of critical communication infrastructure – is a vital basis for the future of mankind. So to endanger the integrity of this critical infrastructure means to jeopardize our future. A cyberpeace initiative must be launched to preserve the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the communication infrastructure. Peace studies and the development of peace keeping strategies in cyberspace should be promoted.
• Democratic control of the Internet and cyber security strategies. Today, cyber strategies are developed and implemented secretly. Meanwhile, only transparent cyber security strategies can be confidence-building measures and counteract an armament race in cyberspace. So democratic control and separation of powers are required. Parliamentary approval for cyber security strategies and its implementation must be mandatory. Cybersecurity strategies should be an outcome of legislative democratic decision-making. They have to be controlled by a division of powers.
• Online protest is not a crime. Information and communication via the internet nowadays is common practice. So to exercise fundamental rights – e.g., free speech – must not be considered a crime. Especially, it must not serve as a reason for military response or war as well. Examples are consumer protests against online services. The right for civil disobedience and online protest has to be respected. Online protest must not be criminalized or even serve as a reason to start a war.
• Well-defined and demilitarized political language. Finally, politics and media frequently use vague language with the effect of potential escalation of conflicts. E.g., using the term „cyberwar“ might suggest, that only military solutions are possible. Cybercrime, in contrast to cyberwar, must be targeted by means of criminal law, not by military; this has to be reflected in political language.

We consider these four fields – trust, non-violent conflict resolution, securing vital infrastructure and democratic political control – an appropriate framework to achieve cyberpeace. We are convinced, that this framework and the demands will help us to take the political decisions to reject the military colonization, promote peace and human and civil rights in cyberspace.

Acknowledgments

The framework and the claims cited in this paper are a result of collaborative work in the Cyberpeace campaign team.

References and Notes

1. FIfF e.V.: Forderungen zum Cyberpeace. FIfF-Kommunikation 2014, 4, 62-65.
2. Foschepoth, J.: Überwachtes Deutschland. Post- und Telefonüberwachung in der alten Bundesrepublik; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen, Bristol, Germany, U.S.A., 2002
3. Greenwald, G.: No place to hide. Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State; Metropolitan Books: New York, U.S.A., 2014
4. Luhmann, N.: Vertrauen; 4^th ed.; Lucius & Lucius: Stuttgart, Germany, 2000
5. Schneier, B.: Liars & Outliers. Enabling the Trust that Society needs to Thrive; John Wiley & Sons: Indianapolis, U.S.A., 2012

“We have started handling the new scripts, but we are still very far away from thinking the protocols, from defining the definitions for the tools needed.” (Werner, 2014)

The desire to understand our technophile novel information society, as response to the responsibility of the sciences of information, requires a encoding of its components, and relationships between them. The mere understanding of an environment as a set of physical boundaries belongs to the past, and is increasingly replaced by structures of communication. The physical codes of architecture are being extended by digital means of information exchange, leading to a transformation not merely of the city itself, but also of the city’s behavior; in the age of cognitization a phenomenon that offers unknown fields of operation. The smart city is dead, the cyborgian city as a biological conscious organism is rising. However, when investigating into the subject we first and foremost are required to look into basic strategies of how biology computes in order to understand the main principles of action, reaction, interaction, input, mutation and conversation.

For architects and urban designers think, work and handle decision-making processes differently to computer scientists or biologists, the current approach of the smart paired with biological form bears the risk of remaining in a formalist stylistic betrayal rather than comprehending concepts of behavior, process and homeostat as the architecture itself.

The talk discusses if and how we as an ecology for and of design can design the right differences for decision-making.

Do we need to at all?

Or is a natural design strategy given?

Since “the organism and its environment are to be treated as a single system, the dividing line between ‘organism’ and ‘environment’ becomes partly conceptual […]. Anatomically and physically, of course, there is a unique and obvious distinction between the two parts of the system; but if we view the system functionally, […], the division of the system, into ‘organism’ and ‘environment’ becomes vague.”
Design for a Brain, Ross Ashby, 1954

References

1. Ashby, Ross W.; Design for a Brain, Publisher: Wiley New York, USA, 1954;
   39.
2. Werner, Liss C.; Clarifying the Matter – It’s a stage change not a paradigm shift. In Biodigital Architecture and Genetics II, Editor, Alberto T. Estévez; Publisher: ESARQ Barcelona, Spain, 2014; p. 218.

Problem Background

Understanding and functioning in the constantly evolving and increasingly complex world in which we exist requires systems of equal or greater complexity (McDaniels and Walls, 1998). Such systems must recognize the dialectic relationship between the hard and soft (rational and values/ethics) (Churchman 1971), and a Singerian-Churchmanian inquiry systems (SCIS) has been proposed as a system that achieves this (Mason and Mitroff, 1973). SCIS are able to effectively and efficiently address both wicked decision problems and uncertainty by producing exoteric knowledge to solve the problem at hand. Knowledge is a collection of information, an activity, or potential and includes ethics, morals, values and aesthetics in addition to scientific and specialized knowledge (Churchman, 1971). It is generated and constantly refined by continual, multilevel learning and adaptation through feedback by the sweeping in and synthesis of additional data, information, and technical, organizational, social, and personal perspectives (Singer, 1959; Churchman, 1971; Courtney, Croasdell, and Paradice, 1998). However, SCIS in and of themselves are multifaceted, multilevel phenomenon, and understanding them, yet alone implementing them, is almost overwhelming in itself in terms of its complexity. Thus, making these systems understandable and available to non-experts is extremely challenging—at a time when such understanding is critical.

Research Purpose

One possible approach to address this challenge is to cast SCIS in terms and concepts which are more familiar to wider audiences. This research attempts to do so by utilizing the concept of a contemplative garden as a SCIS. A contemplative garden is a system that effectively integrates and manages the tensions created by the physical and the spiritual, and whose ultimate purpose is to offer the possibility of realization. It magnetizes us with its sensual beauty and layered meanings, where awareness is enhanced and mind and body drop away. We thus experience the basic nature of who we really are, and it is from this enlightened view that values emerge; yet such values never exactly fit the reality of the moment but reside in a state of tension with phenomena.

We conceptualize a contemplative garden as a SCIS because, at some level, almost everyone is familiar with and has experiences interacting with nature and the components that make up a contemplative garden. We take a systems approach which focuses not only on key system parts but how these parts interrelate and exist in states of tension. This research draws on the expertise and experiences of an award-winning landscape architect whose design of contemplative gardens is influenced by his being a Buddhist monk, and by an information systems researcher whose interests include complex adaptive systems and sensemaking.

This research sheds light on how design influences the tension and integration of rational and values-based aspects of systems. Just as the integration of information and values is full of paradoxes, interrelationships, and potential conflicts, so is garden design. System design affects how we perceive, participate, and act in our world—including the values shaping our actions. Design facilitates co-construction and synthesis of system parts, and feedback loops where system output is part of and affects the system itself. Insights and key concepts about SCIS derived from contemplative gardens and their design are discussed and how vision and information interact in such gardens are presented, as are examples of when this does and doesn’t work.

A Contemplative Garden as a Singerian-Churchmanian Inquiry System

A contemplative garden is an SCIS in that both are systems with goals that are achieved through the integrations of parts themselves and the environment. Such systems exist in a dynamic balance resulting from the tensions among the different parts. Their outcomes are dependent on the different perspectives we take, and are impacted by the design of the systems themselves.

1. A Systems Approach

Both SCIS and contemplative gardens are complex adaptive systems (CAS). A CAS is a system where agents interact with each other and where these interactions and the resulting system behavior are nonlinear (Cilliers, 1998). SCIS are CAS in that they generate their outcomes by sweeping-in and synthesizing additional data, information, and perspectives from multiple agents. Likewise, a contemplative garden is a bounded complex adaptive living system based on nature and its five elements: earth, water, fire, air, and space. Gardens consist of categories (different rock types, flower types, etc.,), behaviors (movement, growth rates and patterns), spatial relationships, and values. Thus, the outcomes of both SCIS and contemplative gardens are a function of the nonlinear interactions of their parts, and such outcomes themselves are nonlinear and not the result of apparent cause and effect.

2. System Goals

Both SCIS and contemplative gardens have similar goals. The goal of a SCIS is to solve the problem at hand, whether it be wicked or uncertain, by producing exoteric knowledge. Similarly, the goal of a contemplative garden is realization by creating an environment of heightened awareness where we focus on the present moment. Achieving such goals often requires restructuring the goals or the problems themselves. A fundamental characteristic of a SCIS is that it changes the nature of the basic problem (Mason and Mitroff, 1973). Likewise, the goal of a garden challenges the very notion of goal. It is a place where time stops or has a different contour where every moment presents a new vista, odor, breeze, or experience. We become aware of nature, and occupied with beauty, too much in awe to follow our habitual thought patterns. This is an environment suitable for realization, experiencing the ineffable and transcendent realm. The goal, then, of the garden designer is to create an environment where we feel at one with nature, within ourselves, and with one another.

No objective measurement of goals for either system exists. In SCIS, such measures are constantly evolving, and SCIS output “is to be taken as is” (Churchman, 1971, p. 202) and guaranteed by agreement among the different participants, where new variables and laws are swept in to provide guidance and overcome inconsistencies. A garden is a bounded sacred space; however, what makes it a sacred space and how that ‘sacredness’ is sustained, activated, and experienced is uncertain and constantly evolving. The implication is that, rather than there being a correct solution, there are multiple, possible ‘good enough’ solutions. What is important is that both systems make us aware of the process by which we attempt to achieve our goals or solve our problems.

3. Achieved Through Integration of Parts

In both types of systems, such goals are achieved through the integration of parts with the self. SCIS produce exoteric knowledge by sweeping in, integration, and synthesis of all available information and values from multiple perspectives. A contemplative garden can be characterized by the Tibetan word ‘hla’ which means uplifting, inspiring, heavenly, and relaxing. All senses are occupied by vistas, odors, sounds, and feelings. The unfolding experience of the garden is the sole input into consciousness. It creates a sense of being at one with nature and at one with oneself, as opposed to feeling alienated, lonely, and threatened. We lose sense of personal identity and become the garden. The gardener becomes the garden, and the garden becomes the gardener. In both systems, the integration of the parts with the self is intentional and involves the orchestration of perception and experience. All parts affect and are affected by all other parts. Where we enter and exit, what the entry and exit experiences are, and what happens as we move through the space is considered. We experience integration within – physically, psychologically, and emotionally – and with nature, which encourages an experience of connectedness within and without, resulting in the realization of Inter-Being. It is from this perspective that values emerge and analogies reveal meaning.

4. Both Exist in a Dynamic Balance Involving Tensions

This integration of parts does not result in the systems being in equilibrium; rather, they both exist in a state of dynamic balance involving tensions between parts within the system and between other systems. SCIS involve the tension resulting from the dialectic interaction between the hard and soft. There is a tension between the relation of the unchanging absolute and the always changing manifest. Likewise, a contemplative garden utilizes a dialectic process between the physical and the spiritual to achieve their goals of realization and heightened awareness. The garden depends on a balance and harmony between all categories and behaviors, yet such balance is the result of the tension between the parts of the garden themselves and the environment. This reflects the tension between earth and heaven.

 5. Tensions the Result of Constant Change

The tensions that exists in both SCIS and a contemplative garden are the result of different system parts constantly changing at different rates. In SCIS, knowledge, generated by continual learning and adaptation through feedback, is constantly evolving, and Information is always expanding. Values tend to be more static than information but can evolve and change over time. In Abrahamic cultures they come from God through scripture. In Buddhist and Hindu cultures values are organized around the concepts of karma and enlightenment. In sectarian societies, values are made explicit as laws. There seems to be inherent tension here between what is conceptual and what is always changing.

Similarly, a garden is alive and constantly changing. So, as plants grow and change, human function alters, or age and decay take back that which was their own, the garden needs to be continually redesigned, renewed, and regenerated. This is made more challenging in that different parts of the gardens change at different rates. In the garden the design vision is fixed, but the garden itself is constantly changing. So, change needs to be managed to adapt to the vision of the design, or if information leads to reassessment of the garden's vision, the vision itself may need to be adapted to align with the evolving information.

6. Perspective

The outcome or effect of both system types is dependent on the perspective of a person at a particular place and point in time. In SCIS, different types of information and values have a different impacts and change at different rates, changing the value of the information and thus the information sought or paid attention to. It also can change the impact our values have on the outcome of a system at a particular point of time. Thus, what we consider, when we consider it, and how we consider it, changes the outcomes of such systems over time.

Likewise, different parts of a contemplative garden have different impacts on its goal and, as the parts change at different rates over time, our perspectives and thus our realizations and sense of heightened awareness also change over time. Outcomes are influenced by entry and exit points, and proportions and scale resulting from the patterns in the composition and the different perspectives we utilize. All of this, for both systems, is influenced by our sense of self and our intentions and motivations. The influence of perspective must be considered if we want to be truly able to meet the goals of the systems.

7. System Design’s Impact on Effectiveness

The appropriateness and effectiveness of both systems are influenced by their design. Design impacts how effective both systems are at reaching their objectives, as illustrated by the importance of design in terms of structure and intention. The structure of both systems involves layered meaning created by patterns and relationships (physical, emotional, psychological), metaphors, allegories, stories, history, poetry, and myth. Such patterns are ordered by not symmetrical.

Implications are that system design influences what senses we use more and when we use them. This further influences what we notice or don’t notice. System design is not symmetrical; rather, asymmetrical design is purposively done in order to influence the interaction, integration, and interdependency of the different parts. This includes the impact and integration of emotions and information and the influence of movements or non-movement and different types of movement. It makes us consider what categories (rocks, ponds, flowers, trees, shrubs, stopping places, etc., or information, knowledge, values, norms) are critical to balance and harmony.

References

Churchman, C. W. (1971). The Design of Inquiry Systems. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Cilliers, P. (1998). Complexity and postmodernism: understanding complex systems. London; New York: Routledge.

Courtney, J. F., Croasdell, D. T., & Paradice, D. B. (1998). Inquiring Organizations. Australian Journal of Information Systems, 6(1), 3-15.

Mason, R. O., & Mitroff, I. I. (1973). A Program for Research on Management Information Systems. Management Science, 19(5), 475-487.

McDaniel, Jr., R. R. & Walls, M. E. (1998). Professional Organizations Stuck in the Middle: A Complex Adaptive Systems Approach to Achieving Organizational Turnaround in Adverse Situations. Advances in Applied Business Strategy, 5, 131-152.

Mosko, Martin & Noden, Alxe. (2004). Landscape as Spirit: Creating a Contemplative Garden. Shambhala Press.

Paul, D. L. (2006). Addressing Complex Decision Problems in Distributed Environments Wisdom, Knowledge, and Management (pp. 81-103): Springer.

Singer Jr., E. A. (1959). Experience and Reflection. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Collective intelligence

I'd like to ask whether social networks support man´s intelligence. The answers differ, we can distinguish between two types of opinions.

J. Surowiecky claims social media are in an equal position to traditional media. The first time this happened was the 2004/2005 tsunami in Southeast Asia. Videos and blogs reported on the situation sooner than newspaper and TV stations. Mainstream media used social media as a source. The motivation of social media journalists is not profit, but sharing their story, getting attention of the fans, readers and listeners. General public was active in the process of getting, analyzing and spreading information.

Surowiecky claims a group can be in some instances more intelligent than the most intelligent of its members. His book the Wisdom of the crowd (2005) is based on numerous case studies and anecdotes where his claim was confirmed. A typical example he uses is the Galton´s experiment in which the weight of ox was better estimated if individual guesses were averaged than if its weight was estimated by any group member or an expert. Surowiecky´s examples can be classified into categories like cognition (market judgemenet and evaluation which is faster and more precise than an expert´s assessment), coordination (people naturally coordinate their behavior in the traffic, in using public spaces etc.) and cooperation (people trust one another on the market without a central control). For the formation of a wise crowd diversity of opinions, independence, decentralization and aggregation is necessary. However, in many cases crowd produces bad behavior. The reasons for that are too much homogeneity in the crowd, centralization, isolation and division of information, imitation of crowd members and unsuitable emotionality.

The advantages of network society are not limited to the crowd phenomena. E.g. in the game industry there were some attempts to use game players in solving real issues, but within the game environment. The advantage people have in comparison to computers is recognizing patterns (2014).

Anonymous collectivism

On the other hand blogs, wikis and social networks repeat the opinion that has been once formulated. It is difficult to have an individual opinion as the power of the group is very strong. The members of social networks want to belong into the group and that is why they repeat the group's opinions. For the Surowiecky´s principle it is necessary that somebody calculates the average and so the advantage of crowd intelligence is dependent on an enlightened member of the crowd.

The idea of collective intelligence has been attacked by many other thinkers. J. Lanier thinks the aim of social networks is to destroy one's intelligence and support anonymous collectivism. He even calls the online collectivism “digital Maoism”. An example can be the speculative bubble, i.e. crowd craziness that causes that shares’ prizes go up or down. Group fanaticism led to the support of Nazism, communism, religious fanaticism etc. There is no reason to think that digital revolution would lead to a change in the thinking of crowds.

Lanier criticizes in his One-Half a Manifesto (2010) a situation when computers become masters of life. Computer´s computing power increases, but their performance increases slowly. The problem with computers consists in their inability to be creative. If we succumb to them we lose the potential plurality of perspectives on the world.

In his Digital Maoism (2006) he criticizes the situation in the cyberspace where we consider just one source of information like the Wikipedia authority, where the relation to the real author and the sophistication of his ideas is lost, where the source of information creates a false sense of authority behind the information, where the information source produces mainstream beliefs and where information is manipulated by anonymous editors behind the scene. All these approaches create some sort of totalitarianism.

With the spread of social media and big data, the potential for manipulation and totalistic tendencies increased. The big data analysis has been used in presidential elections, in commercial applications, marketing and other areas of human life. They use the common human features like the willingness to help, altruism, reciprocity, empathy, respect for authority, group specific features (e.g. group identity), and individual features (sterotypes, submisivity, prosocial behavior etc.).

Janus face of technology

If we criticize the limited perspective on network media it will turn out that technology has a Janus face as Arnold (2003) formulates it. The critique of its negative influence will provide space for the appearance of its opposite effects. Arnold´s claim is that technology including network media has a dual face: on the one hand it supports the purpose for which it was designed, constructed and used, but on the other hand ironically it provides unintended effects that lead in the opposite direction. To provide some examples we can mention antibiotics which were originally invented to provide protection against bacteria and pathogens and to reduce diseases. In the course of time they made pathogens stronger and our health weaker. Air conditioning cools down the inner environment, but increases external temperatures. The linear logic of cause and effect doesn´t work here. ICT which abolished distance among community members created an environment where almost everybody is at the same distance (Heidegger, 1969). Cooper (2002) states that our increased ability to assert oneself is at the expense of one´s quality and maturity.

If we look at the effects of new media we can generalize the results of Arnold who analysed the effects of mobile phones. His analysis is not instrumental, he accepts technology and stays away from it – he evaluates it critically.

The first appreciated quality of new network technologies is their mobility: they are small, can operate without cable connection to the internet, have many functions and don´t bind its user to a specific environment. He can move without losing the ability to work. On the other hand because technology allows unanimous identification of the device, it also fixes its user to itself and the user is always available. He has no free time. New technologies allow independence, one can travel, be in contact with many friends and colleagues, but technologies require at the same time that everybody has it and has a compatible type and operating system. The communication at distance may cause isolation and vulnerability, one communicates, but the partner is at a distance, the interaction is limited etc. The information is available, but without context, simplified, without warranty. The bridging of distance to others or to information is ostensible only. And using communication technology means I am in the same position as other users, I am part of their community, but still isolated and at a distance. People who are physically close become distant in their ideas – they communicate with somebody who is not present, solve issues which are not related to their physical context etc. But they can be closer to more urgent issues or to people to whom they otherwise wouldn´t be able to communicate. Modern technologies also break the difference between close and distant friends as everybody is at the same distance. On the other hand that may be helpful and allow finding new friends or deepening the relations that may be developed in reality. People get new senses (hear at long distance, remember big amounts of data due to their online databases etc.), but can be accessed, analysed, influenced as well. The boundaries between private and public, free and charged, available and busy, important and not important is more fixed as the signal can be coded, the switched off device can´t be from a distance switched on, without password the access is not possible, but more benevolent at the same time as login information can be stolen, code can be broken etc. The idea of new technologies is to save time, help their users, do some work for them, but they waste their time with their games, competitions, supply of functions etc.

Conclusion

What we must keep doing is to criticise the current understanding of the world in order not to get caught in one of its aspects.

The problem of the relativist thinkers is that they don´t question the closed context of human behaviour. The ideas of the critiques of new technologies are grounded, but their result, that they uncover the only substance of technology is not, their critique just opens space for various aspects technology can have. If we criticise it from one perspective it will show its other character because it has Janus faces.

References and Notes

1. Arnold, M. On the phenomenology of technology: the “Janus-faces” of mobile phones, Information and Organization 13, 2003, pp. 231–256
2. Cooper, S. Technoculture and critical theory: in the service of the machine? London: Routledge, 2002
3. Heidegger, M. Discourse on thinking. New York: Harper & Row, 1969
4. Lanier, J. Digital Maoism: The Hazards of the New Online Collectivism. http://edge.org/conversation/digital-maoism-the-hazards-of-the-new-online-collectivism, May 30, 2006; Retrieved December 10, 2014.
5. Lanier, J. One-Half a Manifesto. https://edge.org/conversation/one-half-a-manifesto, November 10, 2000; Retrieved July 13, 2014.
6. Surowiecki, J. The Wisdom of Crowds. Anchor Books, 2005, ISBN 0-385-72170-6.
7. The Guardian, How online gamers are solving science's biggest problems, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jan/25/online-gamers-solving-sciences-biggest-problems, 2015; Retrieved May 5, 2015

This keynote talk discusses some foundations of a critical theory of the Internet. It visits three specific critical theories of the media, communication, technology, culture and society: works by Raymond Williams, Dallas Smythe, and Herbert Marcuse. It argues that insights of these thinkers can form foundations for a critical theory of the Internet. All three thinkers have had profound influence on my own work and thought, which is especially evident in two of my recent books: Digital Labour and Karl Marx (2014) and Culture and Economy in the Age of Social Media (2015). I will also talk about these works in this presentation.

Christian Fuchs is Professor of at the University of Westminster’s Communication and Media Research Institute (http://www.westminster.ac.uk/camri), one of Britain’s leading institutions in this field. He is also director of the Centre for Social Media Research (http://www.westminster.ac.uk/csmr), editor of the journal tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique (http://www.triple-c.at), Vice-Chair of the EU COST Action Dynamics of Virtual Work, Chair of the European Sociological Association’s Research Network 18 – Sociology of Communications and Media Research, and author of books such as Culture and Economy in the Age of Social Media, Digital Labour and Karl Marx, Social Media: A Critical Introduction, OccupyMedia!, The Occupy Movement and Social Media in Crisis Capitalism, Foundations of Critical Media and Information Studies, Internet and Society: Social Theory in the Information Age.
Twitter @fuchschristian Website: http://fuchs.uti.at

Most recent books:

Culture and Economy in the Age of Social Media: http://www.routledge.com/u/routledge/9781138839311

Digital Labour and Karl Marx: http://www.routledge.com/u/routledge/9780415716161