The most natural expression of the aim of objective knowledge according to Thomas Nagel is ‘we must get outside of ourselves, and view the world from nowhere within it’ [1]. Taken literally, however, he finds it unintelligible. Realistically, we cannot in fact get outside of ourselves; we can only hope to achieve a more detached conception by relying ‘less and less on certain individual aspects, and more and more on something else, less individual, which is also part of us’ [1]. This ‘self-transcendent conception should ideally explain (1) what the world is like; (2) what we are like; (3) why the world appears to beings like us in certain respects as it is and in certain respects as it isn't; (4) how beings like us can arrive at such a conception.’ [1]
Nagel’s self-transcendent conception of objective knowledge is dynamic, involving a dialectic between changes in knowledge of (1) and (2) to form an explanation of (3). In modern times, epistemological problems often occur due to advancements in the human sciences; however, Nagel laments that (4) is often lacking: ‘We tend to use our rational capacities to construct theories, without at the same time constructing epistemological accounts of how those capacities work. Nevertheless, this is an important part of objectivity. What we want is to reach a position as independent as possible of who we are and where we started, but a position that can also explain how we got there.’ [1, e.g., 2]
Jean Piaget’s research, especially his research on the psychogenesis of concepts, contributed to (2); however, this was done to epistemological ends. He conceived of a scientific epistemology founded solely on development, and the psycho- and historiogenesis of knowledge were its methodological pillars. It is known as ‘genetic epistemology’ but represented a research programme rather than a finished theory [3]. Nevertheless, after decades of research, Piaget concluded that objective knowledge is a process rather than a state [4]. More importantly for the present purposes, however, genetic epistemology also provided an explanation for (4).
In this paper, I argue that Piaget explains how beings like us develop rational capacities to construct theories. Having first given my reasons for choosing Nagel’s conception of objectivity in the Introduction, I proceed to characterise ‘theory’ and show that the concept has both logical and algebraic descriptions under Logical and Algebraic Descriptions of Theories. Under Development of Our Rational Capacities, I then briefly sketch Piaget’s account of how our rational capacities develop. This development culminates in hypothetico-deductive thought, and, under The Structure of Hypothetico-Deductive Thought, I set out the interpropositional grouping, which characterises our rational capacities at this stage of development. Under The Interpropositional Grouping: A Canonical Theory, I compare the interpropositional grouping with the algebraic description of theories and conclude that the interpropositional grouping actually represents an archetypical theory. Finally, I conclude by briefly summarising my findings before locating genetic epistemology in a view from nowhere.
References
1. Nagel, Thomas. 1986. The View From Nowhere. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA.
2. Johnson-Laird, Philip N. 2008. How we Reason - Oxford Scholarship. October 23.
3. Piaget, Jean. 1950. Introduction à l’épistémologie génétique. (I) La pensée mathématique. Electronic version from Fondation Jean Piaget pour recherches psychologiques et épistémologiques. Pagination according to 1st edition 1950. Vol. 1. 3 vols. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
4. Piaget, Jean, and Rolando Garcia. 1989. Psychogenesis and the History of Science. Translated by Helga Feider. New York: Columbia University Press.