Is information a sufficient basis for cognition? (Part 1)
Published: 30 July 2010 by Molecular Diversity Preservation International in The 4th International Conference on the Foundations of Information Science session FIS 2010
Molecular Diversity Preservation International, 10.3390/fis2010-00365 (registering DOI)
Abstract: Based upon the natural limits of observation, we tackle a critical review of Dretske's approach to information, knowledge and perception. The physics of the manifestation of an arbitrary object –tackled in Part 2 as a separate article– sets forth an informational boundary stating that information cannot be enough to support our cognitive processes. The problems do not rely –as Dretske supposes- on the lacks of the channel, but on the very nature of observation. Furthermore, Dretske's approach –handcuffed to his maximalist support on information- presents some lacks concerning processual character of information, fuzziness of perception and knowledge, contents de dicto and conventional regularities. The posed limits and problems intend to settle new foundations for a more refined conjunction of information and knowledge.